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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
East Meadow Teachers Association
Opinion
and
Award

and
Board of Education, Union Free
School District Noe 3

The stipulated issue is:
Is Constance Fountas entitled to seven days
accumulated sick leave for December 18 through
December 22, 1972 and January 2 and 3, 1973
under the contract?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Board of Education on June 21, 1973.

Mrs. Fountas, hereinafter referred to

as the "grievant," and representatives of the East Meadow
Teachers Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association," and the Board of Education, Union Free School District
No. 3 hereinafter referred to as the "Board," appeared, and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitrators oath was expressly waived.
On the date set forth in the stipulated issue the grievant
was in Greece seeking and undertaking medical treatment.

The

Association contends that she complied with all the requirements
of Article 5 Section 1 of the contract and should have been
paid sick leave for those days.

The Association seeks a recom-

mendation from the Fact-finder that the Board pay the grievant
for seven days sick leave plus 7% interest.
The Board1s position is that the grievant1s trip to Greece

- 2 for medical treatment was unnecessary; that she could have received the same or better treatment in the United States; and
that she used the trip to Greece, whether she received medical
treatment there or not, as a device to expand her Christmas recess (which covered the period December 23 to January 1.)
Based on the record, it is evident to me that the grievant
had every reason to believe that the Board had no objection to
her seeking medical treatment in Greece and that she would be
paid sick leave pursuant to Article 5 for the days in question.
The grievant had been under medical treatment by a physician in New York City.

Following his diagnosis and treatment,

she desired further consultation with and treatment by a second
physician.

A doctor in Greece, known to and respected by some

of her relatives (the grievant is of Greek nationality) was
recommended to her.

She discussed the possibility of seeing

him with her New York physician and he agreed.

Thereafter she

notified her school principal that she would be travelling to
Greece prior to the Christmas recess for medical treatment and
expected to be away for the period of time set forth in the
stipulated issue.

That amount of time was what the Greek phy-

sician indicated would be the minimum needed for the treatment
he expected to render.
tion representative.

The grievant also notified her AssociaBoth her principal and her Association

representative so informed the Board1s Administrative
to the Superintendent.

Assistant

The Administrative Assistant expressly

stated that so long as she authenticated her medical treatment
upon her return, there would be no problem.

All of this was

- 3 done in advance of her departure.

There was adequate time for

the Board to reject her request, or to indicate that she would
be ineligible for sick leave benefits, or to ask for further
specific information regarding the medical treatment she
sought.

The Board did none of these things.

officer clearly indicated that all she needed

Rather the Board1s
to be eligible

for sick leave benefits was to provide authentication of medical treatment she received in Greece when she returned.
Upon her return the grievant provided the requisite confirmation of medical treatment, a medical certificate from the
Greek physician.

This type of authentication

(albeit from

American physicians) has been regularly accepted by the Board,
as a practice, entitling teachers to sick leave pay.
There is no evidence in the record that the grievant did

•

not suffer from a medical condition or that she did not seek

.
and receive bona fide medical treatment in Greece.

That she

may have received the same or better treatment in the United
States is immaterial.

The contract does not confine an employ-

ee to the location where accredited medical treatment for an
undisputed ailment is sought.

And here, where the grievant was

clearly led to believe by an authorized representative of the
Board that there was no objection to her seeking medical treatment in her native country so long as she authenticated it
upon her return, she should not now be deprived of her sick
leave pay merely because the Board and its doctor think that
equally good or better medical treatment could nave been obtained in this country.

Nor per force is there evidence that

- 4her intent was to prolong the Christmas vacation.

On the con-

trary, that recess seemed an appropriate time to go.

Had it

been at some other time, the grievant may have used even more
of her sick leave entitlement, thereby increasing the Board1s
expense in replacing her.
Accordingly the Undersigned, having been duly designated
as the Fact-finder pursuant to the Agreement dated September 1,
1970, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above named parties, makes the following Recommendation:
Constance Fountas is entitled and should be paid
seven days accumulated sick leave pay for December 18 through December 22, 1972 and January 2 and
3, 1973. I find nothing in the contract or the
facts which would authorize the addition of interest. Accordingly, the Associations request for
7% interest is denied.

lric J/ Schmertz
Fact/finder

DATED: June
1973
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of June, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
Cineffects Color Laboratory, Inc.
'
•
and
'
•
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians'
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
|

OPINION

AND
AWARD
CASE #72Q2

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties;
and having duly considered the evidence presented, renders the
following Opinion and Award:

For at least the last five years under the
terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement, and with the knowledge of and
without objection from the Union, bargaining
unit maintenance mechanics have been periodically
and regularly assigned to and have performed
certain work in the "Optical Section". As to
that particular work (the disputed work herein)
this consistent practice, over an extended period
of time during which successive collective agreements were negotiated, pierced and eliminated
any "corporate veil" between the Company and the
Cineffects, Inc. (a sister corporation at the
same location) and effectively classified the
disputed work performed by the maintenance
mechanica at the Cineffects, Inc. or Optical
Section location as bargaining unit work under
the collective agreement between the Company and
Union even though Cineffects, Inc. as a corporate
entity is a not a signatory to the contract.
Accordingly I render the following AWARD:
1. The maintenance mechanics have no
right to refuse to accept or to refuse
to perform, and the Union has no right
to direct them to refuse assignments of
work which maintenance mechanics have
previously performed in the Optical Section.

-22. When so assigned during the life of
the collective bargaining agreement and
under its terms and conditions, the maintenance mechanics shall continue to perform that particular work.
3. If the Union's notice directing employees not to perform the work is still
posted the Union shall remove that notice
forthwith.
If the Union does not do so,
the Company may remove the notice.
4. The Arbitrator's fee and expenses
shall be borne by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: February 12th, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 12th day of February, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

*

Cinneffects Color Laboratories

T

and

x

t

s

T
1

Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702 IATSE

Award
Case No. 73A1

!
r

.1

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collect
ive Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The time limit for rendition of the Award as set forth
in Section 15(b) of the contract was waived.
There is just cause for the discharge of Dennis Torres.
In accordance with Section 15(f) of the contract,
which provides that the fee and expenses of the
Arbitrator shall be paid by the losing party, the
Arbitrator*s fee and expenses in the amount of
$2000. shall be borne by the Union. To expedite payment thereof (which the Arbitrator believes he has the
right to expect) said sum shall be paid to the Arbitrator by the Company, and the Union shall reimburse
the Company in that amount.

Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: April 16, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss/.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 16th day of April, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric JB Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 73A1

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory '
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E. AFL-CIO
'
i
and

'
i

DUART LABORATORIES

'

AWARD

and

OPINION

Case #73A-2

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement in failing to make
proper wage payments to Orlando Temple?
If so what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on July 17, 1973 at which time Mr.
Temple, hereinafter referred to as"the grievant" and representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath and the

contract time limit for rendition of the Award were expressly
waived.

The grievance is denied.

I find that the disputed 25 cents

and hour attached to certain work performed within the Expediter
classification, and that the grievant first received that
additional sum when and because he performed "CBS" expediting
in that classification.

Based on the record before me I find that the grievant
agreed to assume the Expediter classification in January, 1967
provided he continued to receive his higher Negative B rate of
pay plus a shift differential.

The 25 cents in addition thereto

was not part of his pay when he was a Negative B worker but was
added to the rate he carried over from that classification when
he commenced work as an Expediter, because it was expressly and

-2uniquely applicable to the work of the latter classification and
"authorized by CBS."

Therefore I consider it immaterial, whether

as a payroll error as contended by the Company, or otherwise,
that he retained the 25 cents an hour after he returned to the
Negative B classification in September, 1967 and for an extended
period of time thereafter.

The fact is that inasmuch as the

additional 25 cents attached to and was paid for certain Expediter
work, he acquired no contract right to that additional pay when,
as now, he is no longer in the Expediter classification.

Though

the Company may not recoup any such payments during the period he
worked as a Negative B worker following his word as an Expediter,
it is not now required to continue such payments from May 18, 1970
when he resumed the Negative B classification following a period
of time as a Printer No. 3.
Whether he would again be entitled to the additional 25 cents
if and when he is reclassified as an Expediter is not presently
before me and therefore need not be decided until and unless that
situation occurs.
The Arbitrator's fee and expenses totalling $210 (represent?
ing one half-day hearing, one-half day for preparation of this
Award, and room rental at the American Arbitration Association)
shall be borne by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
)ATED: August 1, 1973
Arbitrator
1TATE OF New York )ss.
10UNTY OF New York )
On this first day of August, 1973, before me personally came
tnd appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
.ndividual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
md he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District Lodge #15, International
Association of Machine and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO
Award
and
Fairchild Camera and Instrument
Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated April 1, 1972 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows :
Union Grievance #4664 is denied.

/<S~
sC6*-L4^"^
Eric /T. Schmertz
Arbitrator

/

DATED: March < 1973
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this *
day of March, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
District Lodge #15, International
'
Association of Machine and Aerospace '
Workers, AFL-CIO
f
i
and
'
i
Fairchild Camera and Instrument
'
Corporation
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article XV Step 4 of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement dated April 1, 1972 between District Lodge
#15 International Association of Machine and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Fairchild
Camera and Instrument Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide a dispute involving the Union1s grievance
#4664.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on March 20, 1973 at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath.
Grievance #4664 in pertinent part reads:
The Union is aggrieved at Management for knowingly
violating Article IX Section 16 of the Agreement.
Management is well aware of the six week time limit imposed by the contract but they chose to ignore
it ...
The pertinent part of Article IX Section 16 reads:
If an employee is temporarily transferred into an
occupation in which there are laid off Employees,
the transfer in this case shall not be continued

- 2 beyond the period of two weeks, provided, however,
that two extensions of two weeks each may be added
to the above period, and provided further, that in
each case of such extension the Company will meet
with the Union and discuss the reasons therefor.
The Union contends that the foregoing Section permits the
Company to transfer only one employee into an occupation in
which there are laid off employees and that that single transferred employee may remain in the occupation a total of no more
than six weeks.

The Union asserts that the Company does not

have the right to go beyond a single transfer -- that the temporary transfer of two or more employees into an occupation in
which there are laid off employees would be viblative of the
foregoing contract language.

Alternatively the Union argues

that if the Company temporarily transferred more than one employee into an occupation in which there are laid off employees,
the total cumulative time of all transferred employees may not
exceed six weeks or 240 hours in that occupation.

For example,

without conceding the Company's right to temporarily transfer
more than one employee, the Union contends that if two employees are so transferred they both may work no more than
three weeks each, or any combination which jointly totals no
more than six weeks or 240 hours.
The Company interprets Section 16 differently.

It finds

no limitation on the number of employees it may temporarily
transfer to jobs in an occupation.

It asserts each transfer

may not exceed six weeks duration under the procedures set forth
in Section 16.

It disputes the Union's interpretation that the

six week period is a totality of time worked by all employees

- 3 so transferred.

Instead it argues that each occupation cover-

ed by a temporarily transferred employee may not be so covered for longer than six weeks, but that the six week time limit,
running consecutively, affixes to each particular job so covered separately.

(In the instant case two employees were tempor-

arily transferred and worked four weeks each.

A few days after

they were originally transferred the Company temporarily transferred two additional employees who worked three weeks.

At

some point, a fifth employee was temporarily transferred and
he worked for five days.tor the most part, the periods of time
overlapped.)

Under the Union's first theory the mere temporary

transfer of more than one employee constituted a contract breach.
Under the Union's second theory the temporary transfers consumed a total of approximately fifteen weeks (though simultaneous
for the most part) or nine more than allowed by the contract„
Under the Company's interpretation all five temporary
transfers into occupations in which there were laid off employees, were consistent with Section 16 of the contract in that
each was to a separate job and was for less than the maximum of
six weeks.
The Company concedes that it may not use the device of
consecutively assigning a series of employees, each for less
than six weeks, to cover one particular job where there are
laid off employees in that occupation.

It freely admits that

such a procedure, which could place temporary transferred employees into a particular job for a period well beyond six
weeks, (although each employee so assigned would work no more
than six weeks) would be an improper circumvention of Article
IX Section 16 of the contract.

But it is undisputed that that

- 4 device has not been employed by the Company and is not involved in the instant dispute.
Hence the issue is narrow.

As I see it the question sim-

ply is whether the Company can make more than one temporary
tr aisfer at a given time under the provisions of Article IX
Section 16 and if so whether the maximum six week coverage period attaches to each transfer separately or to all of them cumulatively.
I am unable to accept the Union's interpretation.

The

title of Section 16 is: Temporary Transfers. It is in the plural.
As I see it the first paragraph of Section 16 which reads:
The Company may temporarily transfer Employees into
another occupation but such transfer shall not be
for a period of less than a full work day
is generally applicable to all temporary transfers referred to
thereafter, including temporary transfers into an occupation in
which there are laid off employees.

That introductory paragraph

is also in the plural, i.e. it refers to the Company8s right to
temporarily transfer employees.

It sets the minimum amount of

time for which a temporary transfer of employees may be made.
In my view, the disputed part of Section 16 which follows, is
designed to fix the maximum amount of time for which temporary
transfers may be made into occupations in which there are laid
off employees -- a maximum of six weeks.
Read together, as they should be, Section 16 allows temporary transfers of more than a single employee, including temporary transfers into occupations in which there are laid off
employees; but in the latter case for no longer than six weeks.

- 5 Moreover the phr ase "an employee" upon which the Union relies
in arguing that the disputed language was intended to afford
the Company the right to make only a single transfer, cannot
be construed as a modification of the pluralized introductory
paragraph.

The phrase "an employee" is found elsewhere through

out the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

I doubt, for example,

that the Union would argue that the reference to "an employee"
in virtually all of the other Sections of Article IX, including those covering Seniority, Layoff, Transfers out of the
Bargaining Unit and Permanent Transfers, limit the effectiveness and application of those Sections to a single employee or
a single instance.

Manifestly the reference relates to the

rights of an employee so affected but is not intended to limit those contract sections to a "one shot" application or implementation.

Hence I reject the Union1s assertion that

Section 16 permits the Company to make only a single temporary
transfer to jobs within an occupation in which there are laid
off employees.
In light of this interpretation the Union1s alternative
argument must also be rejected.

As the Company has the right

to make multiple temporary transfers, the contract

language

referring to the initial two weeks and the subsequent two twoweek periods must per force apply to each separate transfer
the Company makes.
The contract phrase "the transfer in this case" can have
only one logical meaning, and that is that each job to which
a transferred employee is assigned may not be covered by a

- 6 transfer for more than two weeks initially and thereafter for
two additional two week periods after discussion with the Union.
Indeed this interpretation is buttressed by the requirement
that the Company discuss with the Union the reasons for "each
case of such extension" (underscoring

supplied).

If the six

week period, as the Union argues, is to be made up of the total
amount of time of all the transferred employees cumulatively,
there would be no reason for the parties to discuss the reasons
for a second or third week two week extension in "each case of
such extension."
It seems to me that had the parties intended Section 16
to be applied in the manner argued by the Union, namely that the
Company has a "total pot" of six weeks or 240 hours within which
it may make only one or more temporary transfers to jobs in
which there are laid off employees, Section 16 would have said
so explicitly.

Certainly it would not have included the present

language which is more susceptible of being interpreted to apply
the initial and succeeding two week periods, to a maximum of
six weeks, to "each case" of a temporary transfer.
I agree with the Union that Section 16 was intended to protect the recall rights of employees on layoff.
parties have done so.

But I think the

A particular job in an occupation which

a laid off employee is eligible to fill may not be covered by
a temporary transfer for more than six weeks.

And as to that

particular job, the Company may not extend the six week period
by temporarily assigning a series of employees thereto

L

periods of less than six weeks each.

for

In other words as to a

- 7 particular job the Company may not defer a laid off employee's
right to recall for more than six weeks.

And I am persuaded

that this is the contractual protection of the recall rights
of the laid off employees which the parties agreed to in Article
IX Section 16.

Trie J/ -Schmertz

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Frank Palumbo and Joseph LaFemina,
as Members of the Board of Trustees
of Firemen's Variable Supplements Fund
and
Joseph J. Perrini and Richard C. Bluestine
as Members of the Board of Trustees of
said Fund
and

OPINION
and
AWARD

John J. O'Reilly and Joseph G. Phalen, Jr.,
as Members of the Board of Trustees of
Fire Officers Variable Supplements Fund
and
Joseph J. Perrini and Richard C. Bluestine
as Members of the Board of Trustees of
said Fund

On October 2, 1972 I rendered an Award in a dispute
captioned as above, which read;
The resolution proposed by the Unions' Trustees
and marked as Exhibit A, except as to the appointment of an "actuary" is a proper exercise of the
corporate powers and privileges of the Funds
within the meaning of Sections B 19-44.0 and
B 19-64.0 of the Administrative Code.
Accordingly the proposed regulation as set forth
in Exhibit A shall be adopted by the Boards of
Trustees of said Funds.
The Award, together with its Opinion are incorporated by
reference herein and made a part hereof.
In my judgment that Award was fully responsive to the
issue as then stipulated by the parties, and met the Arbitrator's responsibility and authority as defined by that issue.
The stipulated issue was:

- 2 -

The Trustees of the Funds having been deadlocked
on whether to adopt by resolution proposed regulations marked as Exhibit A and Exhibit B in the
record, the Arbitrator is authorized pursuant to
Sections B 19-42.Od and B 19-62.Od of the Administrative Code to decide which proposed regulation
is to be adopted by the Boards of Trustees of said
Funds.
Exhibits A and B Respectively read;
EXHIBIT A
Section 11.STAFF AND FACILITIES. In addition to
the staff provided pursuant to subdivision f of
Section B 19-42.0 of the Code, by the Fire Commissioner, the Board shall employ such administrative,
legal or expert assistance as it deems necessary,
and further, the Board shall lease premises and
purchase or lease materials, supplies and equipment as it shall deem necessary.
EXHIBIT B
Section 11.ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF. Pursuant to
subdivision f of Section B 19-62.0 of the Code,
the Fire Commissioner shall assign to the Variable Supplements Fund Board such number of clerical and other assistants as may be necessary
for the performance of its functions. Clerical
and other assistants assigned to such Board shall
not receive, directly and indirectly, any pay or
emolument from the Variable Supplements Fund for
their services.
However, on April 2, 1973 Judge Peter A. Quinn, a Justice
of the New York State Supreme Court granted a motion to vacate
the Award on the grounds that "the resolution which the Arbitrator upheld is silent on the subject of source of funds from
which moneys shall be drawn to pay for whatever particular personnel, premises and materials the Funds may further resolve to
authorize" and that "absent an explicit determination by the
Arbitrator specifying the fiscal source or fund, and the extent
to which moneys therefrom shall be lawfully derived to execute
the power to incur operational expenses, his decision is im-

- 3 perfectly implemented so as to be merely interlocutory and
inconclusive, if not wholly academic.11
Thereafter Judge Quinn "Ordered that the matter hereby
is and the same be remanded to the Arbitrator, Eric J. Schmertz
for further proceedings in conformance with the Opinion of this
Court, and so that he may make a final and definite Award
upon the subject matter submitted to him for decision."
Following that Order representatives of the above named
parties submitted various documentary material in support of
their respective positions, and waived further oral hearings.
Accordingly, based on the entire record before me, and
consistent with the remand Order of Judge Quinn I render the
following AWARD:
1. The Award of October 2, 1972 is reaffirmed and
reiterated herein, to wit:
The resolution proposed by the Unions'
Trustees and marked as Exhibit A, except as to the appointment of an
"actuary," is a proper exercise of the
corporate powers and privileges of the
Funds within the meaning of Sections B
19-44.0 and B 19-64.0 of the Administrative Code.
Accordingly the proposed regulation as
set forth in Exhibit A shall be adopted
by the Boards of Trustees of said Funds.
2. The costs and expenses in implementing the
regulation as set forth in Exhibit A for the
Firemen's Variable Supplements Fund shall be
paid by the Firemen's Variable Supplements
Fund.
3. The costs and expenses in implementing the
regulation as set forth in Exhibit A for the
Fire Officers Variable Supplements Fund shall
be paid by the Fire Officers Variable Supplements Fund.

- 4 4. The payments of said costs and expenses by
said Funds is a lawful exercise of the corporate powers and privileges of the Funds
within the meaning of Sections B 19-44.0 and
B 19-64.0 of the Administrative Code.
5. The Arbitrator's fee for this proceeding in
the amount of $400 shall be paid $200 by the
Firemen's Variable Supplements Fund and $200
by the Fire Officers Variable Supplements
Fund.
6. The unpaid balance of the Arbitrator's fee
for the original case, in the amount of $300,
shall be paid by the Firemen's Variable
Supplements Fund.

Eric Jt Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September *"
1973
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York) " " "
On this •" ** day of September, 1973 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
Local 161

Opinion
and
Award

and
General Electric Company
Salem, Virginia

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Kenneth Jennings? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held in Roanoke, Virginia on August 30 and
October 24, 1973 at which time Mr. Jennings, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afford-

ed full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was

expressly waived,,
This is an "expedited case" calling for, at most, a short
Opinion.

However, from time time there are cases where, be-

cause of particular circumstances, a specific Opinion, no
matter how short, serves no useful purpose to either the winning or losing party.
in that category,,

In my judgment the instant case falls

However, if requested by either

side I

will issue a more specific or definitive Opinion at a latter
date.
Suffice it to say that based on the entire record before

- 2 me, which is most thorough and complete because of the very
able presentations by the spokesmen for both sides, I am satisfied that, for a disciplinary case, the evidence is overwhelmingly supportive of the Company's

allegations herein

and meets the requisite substantial and convincing standard to
justify the penalty imposed„
Additionally the grievant's explanations and defenses are
a compendium of simply too many improbabilities surrounding the
same incident to be believable.
Accordingly the Undersigned, having been duly designated as the Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of Kenneth Jennings was for just
cause. The Union's grievance is denied0

Eric y. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December 10, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 10th day of December, 1973, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to be known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same0
Case No. 3130 0055 73

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

International Association of Machinists,1
and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 1871 '
1

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

'

INTERIM ORDER
Grievance M-8

'
'

The Undersigned Arbitrator having been duly designated
in accordance with the arbitration provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the positions of the parties at a hearing on July
26, 1973, renders the following Interim Order:
The Company and the Union will strive
through a policy of mutual cooperation
to achieve a situation wherein no employee
will be assigned to work beyond his
scheduled shift into the hours of the
succeeding shift, which will deprive a
succeeding shift employee of work except:
1. where the succeeding shift has
been fully scheduled or called in, or
2. where there are no employees on
the succeeding shift capable of performing the job assignment, or
3. where there may be a disruption of
the continuity of the operation, or
4. where the work involved does not
exceed two (2) hours past the scheduled
shift of the employee performing the
job in question, or
5. where the employer representative
responsible for making the decision
does not have reasonable time to call
in the succeeding shift employee, or

-26. where it is required to maintain
the continuity of operations, a shift
in excess of eight (8) hours may be
scheduled, for example a bearing-rollout
or a core loading.
The above is applicable only to Outside Machinists,
and further is only applicable to Saturday,
Sunday and holiday work.

Additionally the

foregoing is without prejudice to the contract
regarding any other situation or occupational
title.

Moreover all of the foregoing is without
prejudice to the rights of either party under
the current collective bargaining agreement
between the Metal Trades Council and Electric
Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation.
If at some future time either party finds the
terms of this Interim Order to be unsatisfactory,
it may raise that issue and the Undersigned
Arbitrator, who retains jurisdiction in case
M-8 will resolve the grievance in that case.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 30, 1973

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584 IBT

and

OPINION

AND AWARD

Hertz Corporation

The Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of John Tiedeman? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on October 1 and 8, 1973 at which
Mr. Tiedeman, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", and
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
I see no useful purpose in an extensive Opinion.

I find

redible the testimony of Donald Wisel of the A & T Glass Company.
I see no reason why he would falsify his testimony.

By testifying

as he did, he implicated himself in misconduct and I consider it
doubtful in the extreme that he would do so if it were not the
truth.

Moreover I see no advantage to the A & T Glass Company

rom his testimony.

That Company has lost the business of the

ompany herein and Mr. Wisel's testimony would hardly be a basis
or a later resumption of a business relationship between the two.
Additionally, evidence potentially favorable to the grievant,
ore accessible to the grievant and Union than to the Company,
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namely testimony by Raul Ruiz, was not offered by the Union.

In

view of the evidence before me, especially the testimony of
Mr. Wisel which explains other circumstantial evidence damaging
to the grievant, I can only conclude that Mr. Ruiz would not or
could not support the grievant's defense.
I conclude that the Company has met the burden of establishing its case against the grievant by clear and convincing
evidence, and considering the nature of the offense, the penalty
of discharge was proper.
AWARD:
The discharge of John Tiedeman was for
just cause.

Eric/O. Schmertz
Arbitrator
/f
DATED:
STATE OF New York )„„.
SS «
COUNTY OF New York)

On this
^
day of November, 1973, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, New York City Taxicab Industry
Local 3036, AFL-CIO Benefit Fund

and

AWARD

lona Garage, Inc.

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the contract
between the above named parties, and having duly considered the
evidence presented at the duly noticed hearing of October 2, 1973
makes the following AWARD:
As of June 30, 1973 lona Garage, Inc.
is delinquent in payment to and owes
the New York City Taxicab Industry,
Local 3036, AFL-CIO Benefit Fund the
'sum of NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
NINETY DOLLARS AND THIRTY FIVE CENTS
($9890.35).
Accordingly said Employer 'is directed
to pay said amount to the Fund forthwith.

Eric v. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: October // 1973
STATE OF New York ),ss :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
* A
day of October, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he e/xecutedthe same.
, , F S. .^A)(WELL,
ff-Sry. r.abhc, Sta>s of New/ork

^* •',- • i.
:

•",

!'•,••

New Yort Cowifv
sa.ri Expire? Marcn 30 . 5"

In the Matter of the Arbitration '
between
'
i
United Automobile, Aerospace and '
Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), Local 379
'
i
and
'
i
The Jacobs Manufacturing Company '

In accordance with Article VII of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated November 1, 1972 between Local 379 UAW, hereinafter referred to as the Union and The Jacobs Manufacturing
Company, hereinafter referred to as the Company, the Undersigned
was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate Section l(c)
of Article XIV of the contract when
it denied the bid of Joseph Dionne
for Set-up Utility Man labor grade 5?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on June 28,
1973 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was expressly waived.
The Union's grievance is meritorious.

Article XIV Section

l(c) reads:
Employees bidding on open incentive jobs
in labor grades 7 through 3, and on open
non-incentive jobs in labor grades 8
through 3, shall be selected on the basis
of ability and skill. When these are
relatively equal, seniority shall govern.

-2By agreeing with the Union to post the job Set-up
Utility Man labor grade 5 for bids in accordance with Article XIV
Section l(c) the Company is estopped from claiming that the job
was not a "new job or vacancy" or an "open" job within the
meaning of that contract section.

Moreover, in my judgement,

implicit in that agreement, and in order for it to be implemented
in good faith, is the condition that not only would the job be
treated as "an open incentive job" and a "new job or vacancy,"
without an incumbent, but that the bidders would be treated as if
they were not or had not occupied that position.

And perforce

that none of the bidders would receive credit in evaluating
ability and skill, from an incumbency in the job.

Any other

arrangement, which accorded ability and skill credit because of
incumbency would beoinanifestly inconsistent with the agreement
that the job be treated as "open" and "new

or vacan(t)."

However in the instant case, the Company, did just that.
In weighing the relative ability, skill and seniority of the
grievant with that of Mr. Raposo (to whom the job was awarded),
it gave determinative consideration to the skill, ability and
other qualifications which Raposo acquired and demonstrated
during his incumbency in the position (which predated, and
continued through the bidding process, and which continues to
the present).

It is clear, indeed undisputed, that the Company

selected Raposo because "of the good job that he has been doing
in the job over the last five years."

Had his work performance
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as the incumbent not been considered, as I conclude it should
not have been within the intent of the agreement to post the
job as "open, new and vacant," I am not persuaded that the
grievant would not have possessed relatively equal ability and
skill.
The fact is that the job is relatively simple.

Based on

his unrefuted testimony I am persuaded that the grievant can
readily perform it.

As an Inspector he inspected the very work

performed by the Set-up Utility Man.

And previously, was

denied a trial period on the job when Raposo was on vacation,
not because he did not possess the skill and ability, but rather
because he was "too valuable in his present job and couldn't be
spared."

To my mind that means that the Company did not dispute

his skill and ability to perform the Set-up Utility Man classification but only did not want to take him away from his regular
job where his presence was needed.
Consequently, the grievant who has greater seniority
than Raposo by more than three years should have been awarded
the job of Set-up Utility Man labor grade 5 inasmuch as his
ability and skill to perform that work were relatively equal to
that of Raposo within the meaning and intent of Article XIV
Section l(c) of the contract.
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Accordingly the Undersigned, having been duly designated
as the Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated
November 1, 1972 between the above named parties and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes
the following AWARD:
The Company violated Section l(c) of Article
XIV of the contract when it denied the bid
of Joseph Dionne for Set-up Utility Man labor
grade 5. The Company shall place Dionne on
that job and make him whole for any difference
in pay since the date that the job was filled
following the posting of March 6, 1973.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 20, 1973
STATE OF New York
)Ss:.
COUNTY OF New York ) '"
On this twentieth day of July, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
"

New York Typographical Union No. 6 '
'
and
'
i
Long Island Daily Press

AWARD
Case No. 1330-0860-72

'

The Undersigned Arbitrators having been duly designated
in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement dated March 31,
1970 to March 30, 1973 and having been duly sworn, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, make the following AWARD:

A. Grohmann, A. Siebold and S. Green
are entitled to a shift's pay for August
19, 1972. A. Grohmann and A. Siebold are
entitled to a shift's pay for September 2,
1972.

ric J/ Schmertz
Chairman

Roland Soloman
Concurring

Murray Richter
Concurring

Irving Newhouse
Dissenting

Nicholas Miranda
Dissenting

DATED:
STATE OF New York ) g g <
COUNTY OF New York) " '
On this <£"/
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of May, 1973 before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same

DATED:
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Roland Soloman to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED:
COUNTY OF New York)s s *
STATE OF New York )
On this
day of May, 1973 before fie personally came
and appeared Murray Richter to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED:
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) " ° *
On this
day of May, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Irving Newhouse to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

DATED:
STATE OF New York )gg.
COUNTY OF New York) ' '"
On this
day of May, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Nicholas Miranda to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration

'
i

between

i
New York Typographical Union No. 6'
i
and
'
•
Long Island Daily Press
'

Case No•

1330-0860-72

OPINION OF
CHAIRMAN

The stipulated issue is:
Are A. Grohmann and A. Siebold entitled
to shift's pay for August 19, 1972, and
September 2, 1972, and is S. Green entitled to a shift's pay for August 19,
1972, because of the failure of the Long
Island Press to employ them as substitutes
on those occasions?
A hearing was held on December 13, 1972.

Messrs. Irving

Newhouse and Nicholas Miranda served as the Publisher members
of the Board of Arbitration.

Messrs. Roland Soloman and

Murray Richter served as the Union members of said Board.

Post

hearing briefs were filed following which the Board of
Arbitration met in executive session.

BACKGROUND:
The Composing Room of the Publisher is a non-departmental office without classifications - in trade parlance, a
"vertical" office.

In vertical offices, all regular situations

and extra positions are consistently filled by the Journeymen
having the highest priority standing, regardless of their
specific area of competence.

In order to balance potential
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difficulties which this adherence to priority might create
in meeting operational needs, the Publisher enjous the unlimited
right to effect transfers among the Composing Room work force.
This arrangement is governed by Section 32 of the Agreement,
which in relevant part states:
"In non-departmental offices without
classifications where situations, when
created, are consistently given out on
on strict priority basis regardless of
classifications, and where extras, when
engaged, are consistently engaged in
priority order regardless of classification (in compliance with extra work
contract provisions) transfers may be
made without limitation."
This concept has also governed the employment of substitutes
Administratively, the Chapel Chairman is advised by the Foreman how many vacancies need be filled on a given shift, and he
provides the foreman the given number of Journeymen from his
list of Priority Substitutes.

Should the Publisher require

more Journeymen than the number of Priority Substitutes available, the Chapel Chairman turns to a secondary supply source
known as "Pensioners".

These are Journeymen who no longer hold

full-time positions or seek regular employment.

They are avail-

able only on a part-time basis and receive a fraternal pension
benefit from the I.T.U.
restrictions.

Their employment is governed by several

They may not be engaged on a given shift until

all available Priority Substitutes have been employed.

They

may not fill "extra" positions (which call for additional compensation); only Priority Substitutes may do so.

They may only

fill-in on "dark" positions, i.e., those created by the absence
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of a regular situation holder.

And, finally, they may not work

beyond a specified number of days in any month without losing
their I.T.U. fraternal pension benefit.

In a 4 week month they

may work 8 days; in a 5 week month, 10 days.

Messrs. Grohmann, Siebold and Green, the claimants in this
case, are Pensioners.

Although it is unclear whether they

formerly held Journeymen positions at the Press, they are not
strangers to its Composing Room.

In the first 7% months of

1972, they filled night shift vacancies there on a number of
occasions.

The night shift at the Press' Composing Room has two
phalanxes (starting times).

On Saturday nights, most regular

situation holders report at 3:14 P.M.; the others at 6:00 P.M.
At the 3:14 P.M. phalanx on Saturday, August 19, 1972, a total
of seven (7) regular situation holders did not report.

Transfers

in assignment were made among the available work force (taking
into consideration the fact that two regular situation holders
were due in at 6:00 P.M.), and all four (4) Priority Substitutes
available that afternoon were hired.

Two (Godley and Roth) were

assigned as Proofreaders; Scarff filled a Linotype Operator
(Black Machine) job; and Olenyik worked the Floor.

This left

three (3) jobs dark: two Swiftape Operator positions, and a
Markup Man.

None of the griewants, it is conceded, were

-4technically competent to fill those specific vacancies.
Publisher, therefore, did not put them to work.

The

Essentially,

its reason was that it could make no further transfers to
accommodate the skills they had.

(Grohmann and Siebold were

primarily Linotype Operators: Green's experience is unclear).
Its failure to hire the grievants - apparently the first time a
regular situation holder vacancy had been left dark when a
substitute was still available for employment - gave rise to the
instance

grievance.

As it happens, the two regular situation holders due to
report at 6:00 P.M. failed to show.

The Publisher asserts it

would have put two of the grievants to work at that time if they
were still available; evidently, they had left.

Thus, on

August 19, a total of five jobs remained dark on the night shift

The factual pattern with respect to Saturday night, Septembe
2, 1972, is not meaningfully different.

The Publisher's re-

fusal to employ Grohmann and Siebold left two jobs dark that
evening: a Swiftape Operator and a Paste Makeupman position.
Its reasons were the same.

Between the September 2, 1972 incident and the date of the
hearing (December 13, 1972), no further refusals to engage the
grievants (or other pensioners): occurred.

Grohmann worked on

eight (8) other occasions; Siebold on 7; and Green on 9.

The narrow question presented here is whether the Company
improperly refused the grievants work on the two nights in
question.

-5The pertinent contractual clauses include:
Section 36, EMPLOYMENT OF SUBSTITUTES
"Foreman shall not select or designate
a substitute. The regular or substitute
shall be the person to select his own
substitute, and shall in no way be responsible for the work performed by the
same, but no foreman shall be compelled
to accept a substitute who is incompetent
or otherwide incapacitated, and if the
regular"s or substitute's selection should
fail to appear on time or should be incapacitated, the foreman shall direct that
another substitute shall be secured. A
substitute selected according to the foregoing provisions shall receive a regular
shift's pay.
Selection of substitutes by regular situation holders or substitutes shall not
contravene Union rules or regulations not
in conflict with Federal or State Law."
Section 8, LAWS
"Both parties agree that their respective
rights and obligations under this contract
will have been accorded by the performance
and fulfillment of the terms and conditions
thereof and that the complete obligation of
each to the other is expressed herein. It is
understood and agreed that the General Laws
of the InternatL onal Typographical Union in
effect at the time of signing this contract,
not in conflict with this contract or with
Federal or State Law shall govern relations
between the parties on conditions not specifically enumerated herein.
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to
interfere in any way with the creatipn or
operation of any rules not in conflict with
Federal or State Law or this contract, but any
chapel or by the Union solely for the conduct of
its own affairs."
Section 9, PRECEDENTS
"No precedents or previous conditions, rules
or agreements shall be recognized in any way
or affect or modify the terms of this contract."

-6-

POSITION OF THE PARTIES:
The thrust of the Union's position is that the Publisher
is obligated under the Agreement to fill all "dark" jobs
created by the absence of a regular situation holder provided
that a competent substitute is available.

The substitute, it

maintains, need not under this Agreement be necessarily competen
to perform the work normally done by the absent regular situation holder.

It maintains that transfers should be made,

thereby accommodating the substitute with work he can perform.
The sole requirement is that the substitute be a competent
Journeyman - a description which it contends is applicable to
the grievants.

It disputes that the Publisher's assertion that

no further transfers were possible on the nights in question.
Its failure to engage the available substitutes on those
occasions to fill dark positions was, it argues, entirely without precedent.

It urges that the grievants be made whole for

their lost work opportunity.

The Publisher does not disagree it has an obligation to
engage available substitutes to fill the vacancies created by
the absence of regular situation holders.

It argues, however,

that this obligation need be met only if the substitutes are
competent to perform the absent regular situation holder's work
or if a transfer can be made to accommodate the substitute.

In

this instance it points out there is no dispute that the
grievants could not perform the Swiftape or Markup duties.
In view of this, it was up to the Composing Room Foreman alone
to determine whether a transfer could be made.

In his judgement,

transfers were not possible on August 19 and September 2, 1972.
His determination took in account the existing complement of the

-7Journeymen present and their ability to perform duties he
required.

It urges that if it were forced to engage a

substitute whose skills are limited to one phase of the operatioi
when transfers could not be made to accommodate him, it would
be saddled with a non-productive employee.

Such a construction

of the Agreement, it asserts, is improper.

It contends, further, that regardless of the long-standing
transfer practice, the clear language of the Agreement does not
require it to accept a Journeyman who is not competent to perform available work if transfers cannot be made.
DISCUSSION
In its brief, the Publisher quoted at length from an award
issued by the Chairman in a case arising in 1962 between the
Jersey Journal and the Jersey City Typographical Union No. 94
(76 ANPA 646).

That case presented an issue similar in several

respects to the instant dispute.

Involved was the denial of

work to a substitute whose sole declared competency was that
of proof reader.

The Publisher, there, as here, asserted it

need not engage a substitute when his competence was limited
and transfers could not be made to accommodate the individual.
In that case, the Chairman stated:
"...I am persuaded that the right of a
priority substitute to employment in
a vacancy other than that of his declared
competency has been and must continue to
be conditioned upon the ability of the
Publisher to make the needed transfer.
Clearly the Publisher is not required to
employ in duties of Linotype or Teletype
or type setting or handman and markup, one
whose sole competency is proof-reading. To
so require him would be clearly violative of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement which entitles the Foreman to hire
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journeymen of 'established competence1...
and permits him to reject as.a substitute
one who is 'incompetent or otherwise incapacitated...1 Rather the contract language
regarding competency...means that the ...
substitute shall be hired when a vacancy
occurs, provided that a transfer in the shop
can be made so that such...substitute can be
used on work in his competency. The Publisher
is thus adequately protected. If the vacancy
is in the competency of the... substitute, there
Lis no problem. If the vacancy is in some other
classification, he need only hire the top
priority substitute if he is able to make the
transfer. If he can make the transfer he is
required to do so..."*

Section 36 of the instant Agreement is identical to the
clause interpreted in the Jersey Journal case.

In my judge-

ment, the reasoning expressed there is equally applicable here,

I am not prepared to conclude that Section 36 requires the
Publisher to engage as a substitute an individual who is plainly "incompetent" in the normal meaning of that term.

Nor am

I prepared to conclude Sfection 36 requires that a Journeyman
need be engaged as a substitute if there is no position available which he is capable of performing after all possible
transfers have been made.

It is undisputed that the grievants were unable to fill
the specific vacancies left dark by the absence of regular
situation holders on August 19 and September 2, 1972.

-The Chairman went on to find that a transfer there could have
been made and, therefore, sustained the claim for a shift's pay
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Despite this, the Company agrees, they were "competent" to
perform some other job in the Composing Room.

Each of the

three, after all, was an experienced Journeyman familiar with
the Press' operations.

Grohmann had served as a substitute

on 27 separate occasions in 1972 prior to August 19th.

Green

had done so 18 times, and Siebold 13 times.

In this case, the grievants1 claim must rest upon a
determination as to whether the Publisher could reasonably
have made transfers so as to utilize the competency they
possessed in some productive manner.

The Long Island Press Composing Room is a "'non-departmental
shop without classifications".

As such, the Publisher is free

to make unlimited transfers to accommodate its operational
needs.

It has this contractual right in exchange for its

agreement to fill all extra positions and regular situations in
priority order without regard to the actual classification of
those next in line.

That quid pro quo has for years also been

applicable to the employment of substitutes, including
Pensioners.

The Publisher does not deny this.

Nor does it

dispute the Union's assertion that its refusal to effect
transfers to accommodate the grievants flew in the face of a
long-standing practice to the contrary.
was without precedent.

Indeed its action,

Never before had it failed to hire a
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In brief, I am not satisfied that the Publisher has met
his burden of showing that transfers could not have been
made to accommodate.the grievants.

This conclusion, despite the Publisher's assertion to the
contrary, does not serve to enforce a practice which is
violative of the clear requirements of other contractual
provisions.

Rather, I believe that the Agreement read as a

whole supports a holding that the parties intended to have
substitutes engaged to fill vacancies created by the absence
of regular situation holders.

In doing so, the Publisher has

the unlimited right to effect such transfers as it deems
necessary.

It has an obligation to exercise that right so

long as transfers can in fact be made, and the substitute is
competent to perform some productive work in the Composing
Room.

We find here that the grievants were competent to

perform available work and that the

assertion that transfers

could not have been effected was not adequately established.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Cadet Maintenance Corporation

'
'
i
'
'
'
f

'
'
'

Award
and
Opinion

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties renders the following Award and Opinion:
The discharge of D, Boddie by Cadet Maintenance Corporation is upheld, I am satisfied that the grievant
was employed by this Employer on express condition
that he not be involved in a "chargeable accident."
I conclude that this condition of employment was expressly understood and accepted by the grievant and
responsible Union representatives on his behalf. I
do not find the imposition of this particular condition to have been unreasonable. The grievant had
a prior record of an abnormally high number of
accidents during a prior period of employment with
this Employer, together with some other alleged
offenses which are not germaine to the instant case.
Hence to agree to re-employ the grievant on the condition, among others, that he not again incur a
"chargeable accident " was neither illogical nor
arbitrary. That he was involved in just such an
accident only a few days after being re-employed,is
a manifest breach of that express condition of employment. I need not decide its affect had it
occurred at a much later time. And although that
particular condition of employment agreed to and/or
accepted by the grievant and the Union, represented a
type of "sword of Damacles," I am not prepared to
conclude that it was unfair or unenforceable.
Moreover based on the record before me, the particular
nature of the accident, and the Employer's affidavit
of December 18, 1972, I am persuaded that the accident
was a "chargeable accident" within the meaning of that
phrase and that the Employer incurred financial damage as a result.

- 2 Accordingly there was just cause for the discharge
of D. Boddie.

Eric p. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: January 17, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 17th day of January, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3036, New York City "taxi
Drivers Union, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on Behalf of Tone Operating

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes
the following Award:
There was not just cause for the two week suspension of George D. Jamison. The suspension is reversed and he shall be made whole for the time
lost. There is no probative evidence in the record showing that the last accident for which the
Company holds Jamison responsible and which
"triggered" his suspension, actually occurred.
Though Jamison was suspended because of a prior
accident record as well, I am satisfied that had
the foregoing accident not been charged against
him he would not have been suspended. Accordingly,
in the absence of acceptable evidence that the last
accident in fact took place, the two week suspension
cannot stand.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Impaytial Chairman

DATED: April
1973
ST&TE OF New York )ss.COUNTY OF New York)
On this A> day of April, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3036, New York City Taxi Drivers
Union, AFL-CIO

ij

'
t
'
?
1

and

Award

T

t
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc. '
on
_ _ behalf
_ _ _ _of_ Forest
_ _ _ Garage
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _fi
The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following Award;
There was just cause for the discharge of Leslie
Wallace. The evidence convincingly establishes
that Mr. Wallace attempted a violent assault with
a broken bottle on a fellow employee, and was
stopped only by the last minute physical intervention of other persons in the area. Standing alone
this is an offense for which dismissal is warranted. Therefore there is no need to deal wj,th the
other allegations against Wallace.

vric J. Schmertz
Impajzxial Chairman
DATED* April/X 1973
STATE OF New York )SS.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this / day of April, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
and

AWARD

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Lauran Service Corp;
Jackson Maintenance Corp; !
Marby Garage
s
The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The grievances of the following named employees
against Lauran Service Corp.? for call-in pay or
break-down pay were settled during the hearing
without prejudice and without creating a precedent
by payment of the following sums of money to said
employees:
Harry Hirschorn
.......$ 1.87
Louis Schaeffer ................ 10.00
Mel Klein
32.50
Zaven H. Dimerdjian
10.00
William Mendez
10.00
Louis Riback .... Break-down pay
pursuant to the contract if not
already paid.
Saul Nemeth
10.00
Edward Padillo „..Break-down pay

for January 15, 1973 pursuant
to the contract if the records
show he was dispatched on that
day
Dagoberto Germoso .„........,,., 10eOO
The grievance of Edward Wagner for callin pay is denied.
The grievances of Messrs. Levy and Levitas
for call-in pay are remanded to the parties
for further discussions at a garage level.

- 2 The "Shop Chairman grievance on behalf of entire
garage" against Lauran Service Corp, relating to
the condition of the wash room is remanded to the
parties for further discussions. Both sides should
recognize that the maintenance of an adequate, clean
and sanitary wash room is basically a joint responsibility. The Employer is responsible to install
and to maintain in good working order all requisite
facilities, to provide necessary supplies and to
arrange for cleanings at reasonable intervals„ The
employees have a responsibility to use the facilities in a clean, orderly and otherwise reasonable
manner. It is recommended that the parties establish a joint labor-management committee at the garage level to implement this joint responsibility.
At the hearing the Employer indicated that he would
install a "bubbler" water fountain to replace the
presently damaged and inoperative water cooler.
The grievance of Nerson Santamaria against Lauran
Service Corp. is granted.
His discharge for the
period between November 17 and November 28, 1972 is
reversed. The Employer has not met a threshold requirement of establishing the reason for the grievant*s discharge. Accordingly the grievant shall be
made whole for the period of time between his discharge and the date he was rehired and the notice
of discharge shall be expunged from his record.
The grievances of certain previously listed employees
against Jackson Maintenance for payment for tools
lost in a fire is remanded to the parties for a further conference in accordance with Article XXVII
Section 2 Step 2 of the contract,, At that meeting
the Employer shall provide the Union with specific
details of the extent and nature of insurance coverage and reimbursement he received as a consequence
of the fire. The rights of the parties, if any, in
a subsequent arbitration or in any other forum are
expressly reserved.
The grievance of Michael Mandel against Marby Garage
is granted to the following extent. His discharge is
reversed. I am persuaded he was discharged not for
the accidents he incurred, but rather for a "flag up"
allegation. The Employer has not made that allegation
part of this arbitration.
I have previously stated that the propriety of a discharge depends on whether the reason for the discharge, at
the time the discharge is effectuated, meets the test
of just cause.
An employer may gather evidence in
support of that reason subsequent to discharge. But
he may not, subsequent to the discharge, change the

- 3 reason or advance a new reason to sustain the action
he took. In that latter event his right to discipline
and/or discharge an employee for a later discovered
offense is reserved for subsequent action.
However, the grievant*s accident record in the
instant case warrants some disciplinary penalty, short
of the discharge which the Employer imposed for a
different offense0 Appropriate in my view, is a disciplinary suspension. Accordingly the grievant shall
be restored to work,but without back pay. The period
of time between his discharge and his re-employment
shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for at least
three of the four accidents incurred.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: April
1973
STATE OF New York )SS-V
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of April, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Award
and
Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.
on behalf of Columbia Operating.

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and having heard the proofs and allegations of said parties at hearings on April 23 and May 3, 1973 renders the following AWARD:
The grievance of Jacques Boucher is granted to ltfe.e
extent of two days pay, namely for Thursday and
Friday, February 1 and 2, 1973. The grievant*s
testimony regarding his telephone calls to the
garage and his efforts to speak with Mr. Leslie
Suchman, pursuant to instructions to do so before
he could return to work, seemed forthright, unequivocal and believable. It is contrasted with the testimony of the Company Dispatcher to whom the grievant spoke, who could not clearly remember his conversations with the grievant or what he may have
told the grievant about Mr. Suchman1s whereabouts.
Under the circumstances I conclude that the grievant
tried to reach Mr. Suchman. He was unable to do so
because the Dispatcher told him that Suchman was not
;kr then in the garage or would not be in at all at
that particular time, or because the Dispatcher otherwise failed to put him in touch with Suchman when he probably could have done so.
The grievant1s claim is for 4 days pay, namely for
Wednesday through Saturday, January 30 through February 3. He concedes he made no calls on Saturday,
February 3 to comply with the instructions. So I
deny his pay for that day. Also, it appears that
under his regular work schedule, Wednesday would have
been his day off. So I am not persuaded that in any
circumstance he would have worked on Wednesday, January 30. Accordingly his claim for pay on that day
is also denied. But his claims for pay for Thursday
and Friday, February 1 and 2 are granted.

"f

Eric J,/Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

- 2DATED: May
1973
STATE OF New York ) ~
COUNTY OF New York) * "
On this
day of May, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 IATSE
Opinion
and
Award
Case #73A 11

and
Movielab, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Louis Chiocco? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were duly held.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath and the

time for rendition of the Award were waived,
I find Mr. Chiocco, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," to have been negligent in two respects.

First, consid-

ering his many years of service and experience as a Developer,
he should have been able to make an adequate hand splice even
while the machine was running.

Second, I am persuaded that

he should have known that a "flash test" was running through
the Developing machine at that time and should have stopped
the machine to make the splice.

He should have known that the

safer procedure would have been to stop the machine to insure
making a satisfactory splice, in order not to endanger the
original negative which followed.

His failure om either or

both counts resulted in irreperable damage to the original
negative,,
However, considering the grievant's long period of em-

- 2 ployment and the fact that only recently has he experienced
difficulty with his work resulting in two warnings prior to
the instant incident, I conclude that the penalty of discharge
is too severe.

Rather I shall fashion what I consider to be

a proper remedy as set forth below0
Accordingly the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties, makes the following Award:
Louis Chiocco shall be restored to work without
back pay, but with his seniority intact. He shall
not return to an original negative Developer's job.
Rather the Company shall place him on a different
Developing job of its choosing, even if a reduction in pay is necessary. Following six months
of satisfactory service in the job in which he is
placed, Mr. Chiocco shall be permitted to exercise
his seniority to return to an original negative
Developer's job.
The Arbitrator's fee for three days of hearing and
one day for study and preparation of the Award and
Opinion shall be shared equally by the parties„

Eric V. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: November 19, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 19th day of November, 1973,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO
and

INDUSTRY

'

Award
Case No. 72A10

Movielab, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Employer has violated the contract by requiring
a single employee to run both the Total Vision Step
Printer and the Hollywood Printer in the 8mm Department. The Employer shall no longer require a single
operator to run both machines.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the/-Employer.

Eric J./ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: March H* 1973
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of March, 1973, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Film
Technicians, Local 702, IATSE
AFL-CIO
and
Movie lab, Inc.

'
'
i
'
'
'
'
'

Opinion
Case No. 72A10

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated the contract
by requiring a single employee to run two machines in the 8mm Department, i.e. one Hollywood
Printer, and one Total Vision Step Printer? If
so what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on November 21 and November 27, 1972.
Thereafter the parties submitted briefs,
The Union's principal argument is that the Employer violated Sections 17 (d) and (b) of the contract.

I find the Union's

case to be meritoreous.
The Total Vision Step Printer was placed in operation significantly earlier than the Hollywood Printer.

Prior to the

introduction of the Hollywood Printer, the operation of the
Total Vision Step Printer was the sole and exclusive duty of
the operator of that machine, and I find it to have been a
"present method of (machine) operation" within the meaning of
Section 17 (b) of the contract.
Thereafter (perhaps two years later) the Employer introduced the Hollywood Printer, which I find to be a "new" machine within the meaning of Section 17 (d) of the contract.

The

Employer concedes it did not notify the Union in writing when
the Hollywood Printer was placed in production, as required
by Section 17 (d).

- 2 The application of Section 17(d), in the instant case with
the introduction of the Hollywood Printer, expressly brings
into play the provisions of Section 17(b).

Obviously the Employ-

er should not benefit by relying on his failure to give notice
under 17(d) to avoid the express interrelationship of Sections
17(d) and 17(b).
When the operator of the Total Vision Step Printer was also
assigned the additional job of operating the subsequently introduced Hollywood Printer, a change in "operations from a single
to a dual operation of machines, so that one operator may operate two machines" took place.

That language of Section 17(b)

makes no distinction as to which types of machines, when operated by a single operator, constitute a "dual operation^"
Therefore I am persuaded that the phrase "dual operation" is not
limited to the operation of two of the same type machines.

In-

stead I am satisfied it encompasses the assignment to a single
operator, of the responsibility of running two machines whether
those machines are the same or different types.

Hence when the

operator of the Total Vision Step Printer, also required to run
the Hollywood Printer, a "dual operation of machines" by one
operator was effectuated within the meaning of Section 17(b).
Section 17(b) allows for a change from a single to a dual
operation of machines "provided such dual operation is presently
or may hereafter be in existence in a laboratory operating under
a collective agreement with the Union."

Testimony offered by

the Union that a dual operation of the Total Vision Step Printer
and the Hollywood Printer neither existed in any laboratory cov-

- 3 ered by the contract when the contract was negotiated nor subsequently, was not disputed by the Employer.

Accordingly the

condition under which the Employer is allowed to unilaterally
effectuate this type of dual operation of machines was not and
has not been met.
Therefore the Employer is directed to discontinue the dual
operation by a single operator of the Total Vision Step Printer
and Hollywood Printer.
ed to run both machines.

The Operator shall no longer be requir/*

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston Police Patrolmen's Association

Award

and
City of Boston

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated January 3, 1968 and the Supplemental Agreement dated January 1, 1970 and having been duly
sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Association's grievance dated December 6, 1971
is denied.

Eric S. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED : September ^19 73
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York)
On this *p day of September, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledgedto me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1139 0108 72

FRANK T. ZOTTO
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 41-9311480
Qualified in Queens County
Commission Expires March 30, 1974

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston Police Patrolmen's Association

and

Opinion

City of Boston

In accordance with Article VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective January 3, 1968 and the Supplemental
Agreement effective January 1, 1970 between the City of Boston,
hereinafter referred to as the "City," and Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Association," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the grievance
dated December 6, 1971?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Boston, Massachusetts on June 7, 1972
at which time representatives of the Association and City
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Association and the City filed post hearing briefs.
The grievance dated December 6, 1971 reads:
Violation of Article IX Section D. Avoiding overtime by shifting men from one platoon to another.
The facts are not in dispute.

Two Patrolmen, Russell

McCortnack and John O'Hare were transferred from one platoon to
another.

McCormack was transferred from his regular assign-

ment in Platoon A at District 8 to Platoon C for the period
August 8 to August 21, 1970.

O'Hare was transferred also from

- 2 Platoon A at District 8 to Platoon C for the period October 31
to November 14, 1971.
The Association contends that the transfers were made
for the purpose of avoiding the payment of overtime, in violation of Article IX Section D of the contract which reads:
The scheduled tours of duty of individual employees or groups of employees will not be
changed or altered for the purpose of avoiding
the overtime provisions of this Article,,
The City asserts that its action was consistent with
and supported by a different provision of the contract, namely Article IX Section C, sub-paragraph (5) which reads in
pertinent part:
Overtime service shall not include:
(5) A change in schedule of an employee who
is shifted from one platoon to another or from
one shift (tour) to another shift (tour) for a
period of fourteen (14) or more consecutive calendar days
The City argues that the instant transfers, under the
foregoing Section aad undisputedly for 14 or more consecutive
calendar days, are an express exception to the overtime provisions of the contract; that Paragraph D is inapplicable and
that the Association's claim for overtime pay for the two
grievants is therefore not warranted.
Relevant sections of Article IX must be read in conjunction with each other and not each standing alone.
Based on a full reading of Article IX I conclude that
Paragraph D of Section 3 does not place a limitation or condition on sub-paragraph (5) of Section C.
Paragraph D is precise and significant.

The language of
It proscribes a

- 3 change of scheduled tours for the purpose of avoiding the
overtime provisions of this Article.

Hence by its explicit

terms it refers not to every provision of Article IX but only
to those sections thereof which list the conditions of overtime „
The overtime provisions of Article IX are found in Section 2 in its entirety

and in the introductory paragraph and

in Paragraphs A and B of Section 3.

However, Paragraph C of

Section 3 of which sub-section (5) is a part, is explicitly excluded from the overtime provisions.

Indeed its introductory

sentence reads:
"Overtime services shall not include
-(Emphasis added).

"

Consequently I am constrained to conclude that Paragraph
D, which refers only to the "overtime provisions of this Article"
was not intended to apply and does not relate to sub-paragraph
(5).

In short, Paragraph D places a condition on all of the

overtime provisions of Article IX, but sub-paragraph (5) is not
among those provisions.
Accordingly, so long as the City met the requirements of
sub-paragraph (5),

(and there is no dispute herein that the

transfer was not from one platoon to another and not for 14
or more consecutive calendar days,) Paragraph D cannot be relied upon to contest the validity of that action.
I find nothing in the overtime provisions of Article IX
which requires the City to cover vacation vacancies by scheduling overtime.
has in the past.

The City may do it that way as apparently it
But absent a contract requirement that vaca-

- 4tion vacancies be covered in that manner, I cannot find that
the City's decision in the instant case to cover vacation
vacanies by transferring employees from one platoon to another
for 14 or more consecutive calendar days in accordance with
an express contractual exception to overtime service, constituted an avoidance of the overtime provisions of Article IX
within the meaning of Paragraph D.

Accordingly the Associa-

tion's grievance is denied.

Eric f. Schmertz
Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory'
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E. AFL-CIO
'

and

AWARD

and

OPINION

MULTICOLOR LABORATORY

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company failed to make
proper vacation pay to Emil Pagliano?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 17, 1973 at which time
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath and the contract time limit for rendition
of an Award were expressly waived.

The Union's grievance on behalf of Emil Pagliano,
hereinafter referred to as the grievant, is meritorious.

It

is undisputed that when the grievant was hired he was promised
three weeks vacation per year of service.

It is similarly

undisputed that that agreed upon vacation benefit was in no
way conditioned on how long the grievant remained in the
Company's employ, and there was no requirement that he even
complete one year of service.

Indeed the Company concedes

that the agreement on a "3 week vacation" was "from the
beginning of the grievant's employment."

Accordingly, that the grievant terminated his employment
with the Company after slightly more than five months does not
deprive him of a vacation entitlement based on the three week

-2week vacation per year formula.

I find no basis upon which

the Company has the right to reduce the grievant's vacation
entitlement to a pro-rata of less than three weeks.

Rather,

the express agreement on a vacation benefit, more favorable
than and prior to the negotiation of the vacation provisions
in the contract between the Union and the Company, is preeminent, especially since the Union does not dispute, but
instead affirms the grievant's right to the more favorable
arrangement.

Accordingly

the grievant is entitled to and shall be

paid a pro-rata amount of vacation pay for the period of time
he was employed based on the formula of three weeks per year.

Pursuant to the contract provision that the Arbitrator's
fee and expenses be paid by the "losing party," the Company
shall pay the Arbitrator's fee and expenses of $210 (representing
one half day hearing and one half day for preparation of the
Award and Opinion, and room rental).

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 1, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this first day of August, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405

Clarification of AWARD
in Case # 1230 0160 71

and
Pratt & Whitney, Inc.

A hearing was held in West Hartford, Connecticut on
June 14, 1973, at which time representatives of the above
named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument.
My Award in Case #1230 0160 71 dated August 31, 1972,
reads:
The Company correctly chose to apply the
SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J to Mr. Fortier
upon his return to the Utility Man position
in Department 37 on August 30, 1971. His
proper rate of pay on that date shall be
determined by application of the Altieri
Award.
The question for clarification is whether Mr. Fortier
should have received a rate of pay under paragraph 1 of the
SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX J as an employee with three years recall
rights or as an employee with one year recall rights.
Union asserts the former, the Company the latter.

The

The diff-

erence is 19 cents an hour retroactive to August 30, 1971.
I find immaterial in this case the fact that the grievant
as not actually on layoff out of the plant from the job of
Jtility Man, but rather had bumped or transferred in lieu of
.ayoff, to another classification prior to August 30, 1971.

-2Under the unique circumstances of this case, the Company is
estopped from relying on the latter fact.

For, irrespective

of that fact, the parties expressly stipulated in the original
case before me that the Altieri Award (Case #1230 0159 71) would
determine Fortier's rate of pay if I upheld the Company's
contract position.

As indicated I repeated that stipulation

in my AWARD, after holding that the Supplement to Appendix J
was applicable.
The Altieri case dealt with an employee (William Iverson)
who was on layoff with an undisputed three year right of recall
under paragraph 1 of the Supplement to Appendix J.

In my view

the effect of the stipulation that the Altieri Award would be
dispositive of Fortier's rate of pay if the Supplement applied,
perforce, was that Fortier and Iverson were similarly situated namely in layoff status - for purposes of determining Fortier's
rights under the Supplement.

Indeed the Company's arguments

in the original case before me are consistent therewith.

By

asserting, as the Company did therein, that Fortier should be
deemed on layoff, the Company was saying, as I see it, not merely
(as it now contends) that he should be so treated for purposes
of determining whether Appendix J or the Supplement to Appendix
J applied, but also that the facts in both cases, i.e. grievants
in layoff with three year recall rights, were similar insofar as
how payment should be made under the Supplement.
For that reason I must accept the Union's contention
that the Company is now foreclosed from attempting to show that
Fortier actually occuppied a different status from Iverson and
did not enjoy the same three year recall rights as an employee

-3on layoff.

I find that I must hold the Company to its original

stipulation and to the scope of that stipulation.

In other

words for reasons which are not germane (and not in the record),
the parties agreed to treat Fortier as if he was on layoff like
Iverson.

No other acceptable interpretation can be placed on a

stipulation that deems the Altieri Award as dispositive of the
rate of pay to be accorded Fortier.

That stipulation makes sense

only if Fortier and Iverson are looked upon as factually similarly
situated.

And I conclude that is what the parties agreed to and

intended in this case, irrespective of any actual conditions to
the contrary.

Otherwise the pay of one employee (Fortier) would

be determined by an Award adjudicating the rights of another employee
(Iverson)under different facts.

And that is simply illogical.

Hence the following Award is applicable only to the unique
circumstances of this particular case and cannot be deemed
precedential to any other case under the Supplement.
The Undersigned Arbitrator having been duly designated
in accordance with the contract between the parties dated
October 5, 1970, and having had his authority reinstated by
the parties for clarification of his prior Award, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, makes the
following CLARIFICATION OF AWARD:
Oscar J. Fortier shall be paid as
Utility Man under the Supplement to
Appendix J, paragraph 1, as an employee
who was recalled from layoff with three
years recall rights. He is entitled to
and shall be paid an additional 19 cents
an hour retroactive to August 30, 1971.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

-4-

DATED: August 8, 1973
STATE OF New York )gi
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eighth day of August, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Petroleum Heat and Power Workers
Association

AWARD
and
OPINION

and
Petroleum Heat and Power Co., Inc,

In accordance with Section 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated November 1, 1972 between Petroleum Heat
and Power Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company,11
and Petroleum Heat and Power Workers Association, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as
the Arbitrator to hear and decide certain disputes between
said Company and Union.
A hearing was held on August 28, 1973 at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to present evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

Having considered the

proofs-and allegations of the parties, the Undersigned Arbitrator renders the following AWARD and OPINION:
The grievances of Messrs Fiore, Deringer, Waterbury^Giordano,Conroy and Giudice as set forth
in the Union's letter of March 2, 1973 to the
American Arbitration Association,and the grievances of William Johnson and Fenton Kearney as
set forth in Mr. Sheehan's letter of April 13, 1973
to the American Arbitration Association, are de^
nied.
It is a fundamental principle of contract law
that contract clauses are to be reconciled, not
found in conflict with each other. The Union re-

- 2 lies on Section 9 and contends that because that
Section was negotiated later, it supercedes Section 5. However, under that interpretation Section 5 would be nullified and meaningless. I cannot conclude that the parties left Section 5 in
the contract for no purpose whatsoever.
In my view the better and proper interpretation
is that Section 9 was negotiated and added to the
contract to supplement Section 5, and that both
sections were intended to be implemented together.
Specifically, to be eligible for Saturday or Sunday work employees must qualify first under Section 5. The apportionment of Saturday and/or
Sunday work within that eligible group is then controlled by Section 9. In other words, to be eligible
for Saturday and/or Sunday work an employee must
first work "the five preceding days1' or "the six
preceding days" respectively. Employees who meet
that threshold requirement shall receive Saturday
or Sunday assignments distributed equally among
them based on their particular occupational classification. The grievants do not meet the threshold
requirement.
That the practice for some time may have been different is immaterial here. It is well settled that a
practice that is contrary to contract provisions may,
on notice by one side to the other, be terminated.
Thereafter compliance with the contract language shall
obtain. Here the Company gave proper notice to the
Union that it would henceforth follow the contract
terms, thereby effectively terminating any contrary
practice. Because I do not find the contract terms
ambiguous the prior practice cannot be deemed either interpretative of the contract or preeminent.

The suspension of employee Cullen from February 10
to February 14, 1973 is reversed. He shall be made
whole for the time lost.
The Company has not persuaded me that Cullen's productivity record, though certainly not good, is so
significantly worse than other employees similarly
situated as to warrant the discipline imposed.
Cullen's testimony in his own defense was impressive. I accept as honest and plausible his explanation that because he has been assigned "specials"
and "clean-up work" in differing and unfamiliar work
areas, his rate of efficiency is somewhat less than
others who have fixed routes. He impressed me as
an employee who is trying to do his job properly
but who has been hampered by a variety of different

- 3 types of assignments in different geographical
areas and by equipment break downs. I conclude
he is entitled to the benefit of doubt for the
period of time from the commencement of his employment to the date of the instant arbitration
hearing. However, prospectively he should now be
sufficiently familiar with his duties and routes,
no matter how varied, to be able to improve his
rate of efficiency and productivity. And I think
he should be responsible to do so irrespective of
the fact that the Company has not promulgated formal productivity standards. In my judgment if he
now fails to do so he would be subjfect to discipline.
The Company contention that the contract bars the
Union from submitting multiple grievances to a
single arbitration proceeding is denied.
I share the view of the vast majority of Arbitrators that explicit language is required to restrict
each arbitration case to a single grievance. Such
explicit, conditional language cannot be inferred
from the singular or plural of the word "grievance (s)" in the grievance or arbitration provisions
of the contract. Rather, because this issue is one
that is clearly foreseeable when contract, and
grievance and arbitration clauses are negotiated,
any such limitation can and should be specifically
and unequivocally included in the contract language.
The grievance and arbitration clauses in the instant
contract do not meet that test.
Of course this may not be construed as a license to
the Union to accumulate large numbers of grievances
for extended periods of time before submitting them
collectively to a single arbitration proceeding.
Such would be unreasonable and an abuse of the arbitration machinery. But in the instant case the submission by the Union of the issues herein to this
arbitration was a reasonable application of the
foregoing well accepted rule.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February
1974
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ' " :
On this
day of February, 1974
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 919 Retail Clerks Association
AFL-CIO

and

RULING
Case #72 A/9153

Topps of Massachusetts, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly designated
in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the parties at a hearing on October 23, 1972 makes the
following RULING:
The grievances of Sophie Reed, Mary Pauline Joseph,
Irene Augeri and Frances Nordgren are remanded to
the parties for processing in accordance with the
grievance procedure of the contract. This is without prejudice to the rights and positions of the
parties on the merits of those grievances, and without prejudice to the right of the Union to return
them to arbitration after the grievance procedure
has been exhausted if they are not resolved in the
grievance procedure. The time limits of the grievance procedure commenced as of October 24, 1972.
The foregoing in no way constitutes a determination
of the arbitrability of any other grievance.
The Undersigned retains jurisdiction for the purpose
of determining whether the foregoing has been followed and to hear and determine the grievances on the
merits if they are not settled in the grievance proceduree

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District Lodge No. 15 International
Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO

Opinion
and
Award

and
Washex Machinery Corporation

The Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
In the case of involuntary layoffs which take
place between now and December 28, 1973, are
the affected employees entitled to any sick
leave benefits and if so what?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on October 16, 1973 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath

was expressly waived.
The parties disagree on the application and interpretation of Article XXVIII (SICK LEAVE) of the contract.

With

specific reference to the stipulated issue the Union contends
that upon layoff the affected employees with more than twelve
months service are entitled not only to the unused portion of
6 sick leave days but to an additional 6 days as well.
The Company contends that the maximum that each affected
employee is entitled to is either 6 or 4 days sick leave (the
former for employees with twelve or more months service; the
latter for those with less than twelve months service.) The
Company argues that employees accrue and earn sick leave ben-

I

-3used sick leave may not be carried from one period to the next
period."

In my view, to accept the Union's argument would

carry sick leave accumulated and earned between December 28,
1971 and December 28, 1972 into the subsequent year, and Paragraph (b) precludes that.

Instead, as Paragraph (b) goes on

to provide, on the first payroll period following December 28,
the unused sick leave from the preceding year ending on that
date is to be paid for in cash0

That express contract provision,

together with my review again of the employment history of any
hypothetical employee, under which I am unable to find any
point at which he accumulates an additional 6 sick leave days
prospectively, is not overturned by the Union's reliance on
the language "preceding contract year" as used in Article XXVIII.
As I see it the phrase "preceding contract year" refers
not to the sick leave days which the employee utilizes in a
subsequent contract year, but rather to the period of employment which he must serve in order to become eligible, first for
4 days sick leave during his first twelve months of employment
(one day for each four months of service) and thereafter to 6
sick leave days per contract year after he has worked twelve or
more months.

In short I do not find that Article XXVIII con-

templated a greater sick leave benefit at any time, than 6 days
for employees with twelve or more months service,,
The best that can be said for the Union's argument is that
Article XXVIII is ambiguous and might be supportive of the
Union's theory if the phrase "preceding contract year" is construed differently.

But in cases of ambiguity we look to past

- 4 practice for clarification.

Here it is undisputed that the

unvaried past practice has been consistent with the Company's
argument herein.
Accordingly the Undersigned, having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following Award:
In the case of the involuntary layoffs which take
place between now and December 28, 1973, the affected employees with twelve or more months service are
entitled to pay for the unused portion of up to 6
sick leave days. Affected employees with less than
twelve months service are entitled to pay for the
unused portion of up to 4 sick leave days. The precise amount to which the affected employees are entitled depends upon the date of the layoff. If the
layoffs take place on December 28, 1973 the affected employees in the above two categories are entitled to pay for the unused portion of 6 and 4 sick
leave days respectively. If the layoffs take place
before December 28, 1973, the affected employees in
the above two categories are entitled to a pro rata
amount thereof.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November
1973
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York) ' ""
On this
day of November, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Local Union No. 803, International '
Brotherhood of Teamsters
'
and
Yonkers Racing Association

'
i

Interim
Ruling
and
Opinion

'

The issue is:
Whether Yonkers Racing Corporation, (hereinafter
referred to as the "Company",) reduced its complement of Plainclothes Agents from 13 to 5 in August,
1972 in violation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with Local Union No. 803, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, (hereinafter referred to as the
"Union")?

Hearings were held on February 13 and 19, 1973 at which
time representatives of the Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Two other issues, namely claims for uniform allowances and
payment for pistol permits were settled by and between the
parties during the hearings and withdrawn from arbitration.

I am persuaded that there are compelling reasons -- both
contractual and in the interest of good labor relations -- for
the rendition first of an interim Ruling and Opinion, reserving
jurisdiction for rendition of a final Award and Opinion at a
shortly later date if necessary.

The Company justifies its reduction of the complement of

-2-

Plainclothes Agents on the language of Section 6 and 11 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Those Sections appear to give

the Company the unrestricted right to reduce the work force
based on business needs.

If this is so it would be dispositive

of the issue in dispute.

However, there is the question of whether Sections 6 and
11 are limited by Section 17; whether that latter Section insures a work force of Plainclothes Agents of not less than 13
either as a "benefit" based on "practice" and/or by implicit
continuation of a pre-existing "status quo agreement".

I choose

not to answer these questions at this time because I believe
there is a more serious problem which I am constrained to point
out and to which I firmly believe the parties ought to address
themselves in further direct negotiations.

It concerns the

element of mutual trust.

Specifically there is the real question of whether there
was a "meeting of the minds" over the purpose of Section 6
especially, and how, if at all, it would be implemented during
the term of this, the first Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the parties.
equivocal.

The language of Section 6 is clear and un-

Yet there is evidence in the record on which one

might find that the Union had reasonable grounds to believe that
Section 6 would not be applied or implemented as it was by the
Company in the instant case.

-3-

I make no determination whether the Company in fact
assured the Union that the complement of Plainclothes Agents,
restored to work as a result of a strike just prior to the
contract negotiations, would be retained at work throughout the
term of the Collective Agreement.

Nor, assuming the Union

believed it had such a guarantee, do I determine whether the
Company is so bound.

Rather I limit my findings at this time to

the fact that I am persuaded that the Union, dealing with new
owners of the Track, and negotiating the first Collective Bargaining Agreement may have had legitimate reasons to believe that
Section 6 was included in the Agreement only because it was a
standard provision applicable to other unions at the Track, but
that with regard to the Plainclothes Agents would not be
subsequently implemented to effectuate their layoff during the
term of the Collective Agreement.

Frankly my point is that under the latter foregoing circumstances the present reliance on Section 6 by the Company as a
defense to its layoff of 8 of the 13 Plainclothes Agents within
approximately two weeks after the contract was executed, even
if preeminent as a matter of bare contract law, may be unfair,
inconsistent with what the Union may have reasonably believed to
ave been understood and hence potentially and seriously disruptive of sound labor relations right at the outset of a new
relationship between the parties.

In short, if there is a reasonable basis to conclude that
Union honestly thought that Section 6 would not be so imlemented, even though the Company honestly thought otherwise,

-4the integrity of the bargaining process and the preservation
of mutual trust hangs in the balance if not jointly resolved.

An

immediate Award adjudicating the bare legal right of the parties
under the contract as written, would not achieve that resolution.
It seems to me that that crucial disagreement, now revealed,
should be the subject of further discussions between the parties
in an effort to reach an accord.

Accordingly it is my interim Ruling that the parties enter
into direct negotiations for the next two weeks for the purpose
of resolving one way or other or by compromise, the central
question referred to herein.

The rights of the parties with re-

gard to this particular arbitration and their contentions and
proofs already set forth therein are expressly reserved.

In the

event that the matter is not resolved in the course of direct
negotiations during the next two weeks, I shall thereafter issue
a final Award and Opinion based on the record before me within
ten days after either or both sides ask me to do so.

Eric J/Schmertz
Arbitrator

2

DATED: Apasil 5 1973
COUNTY OF New York)gs.
STATE OF New York )
J

IU£^

On this
J* day of A-p*£l, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers of America
AFL-CIO Local No. 369

and

Opinion
of
Chairman
Case No. 1130 0548 70

Boston Edison Company
Boston Edison Company is a public utility supplying electricity in the Greater Boston area.

Local Union No. 369,

Utility Workers Union of America has represented the production
and maintenance unit of 2000 employees since 19500
The applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement contains
the following provision (Section 5 of Article X):
"5. It is understood and agreed that, if present
operating conditions change or if technological improvements change existing equipment
or introduce new equipment to such an extent
as to justify the Company changing the present Monday through Friday schedules, the Company shall submit the changes to the Union
for approval. If the proposed changes do not
meet with the Union's approval, the issue shall
be settled under the Grievance Procedure in
Article XXIII and by Arbitration under Article
XXXIII."
By letter dated August 7, 1970 the Company proposed certain changes in schedules in the Cable Division.

These changes

involve a total of 36 employees, 18 of whom would be employees
presently in the Cable Division; the other 18 would be either
bidders from other departments or newly-hired employees.
The changes in schedules would provide basically for
shift and weekend coverage where there is now no scheduled
coverage and overtime has to be relied upon for the work during
such hours.

- 2 The Company submitted documentary evidence and testimony
in support of its need of the changed schedule.

Among the

factors relied on were (1) the change in recent years from a
single winter peak operation to a two-peak (winter and summer)
operation, with the result that there is only a short period
of a few months in the spring and fall when Monday-throughFriday day-time cable repair work on the underground system
can be planned, whereas formerly there was a period as long as
nine months for such work; (2) the growth of the system and
cable division work-load; (3) the increase in the traffic problem making cable work in the streets more difficult to do in
the daytime on weekdays; (4) an increase in customers' unwillingness to permit lines to be out of service for maintenance except at late night and early morning hours; (5) the employee's increasing unwillingness

to be available for planned

overtime as shown by the increase in "ask-offs" (expression of
a desire of the employee not to work overtime.) and difficulties in obtaining employees for call-outs; (6) an increased
amount of overtime work; and (7) the increasing unavailability
of employees for daytime work because they are on paid rest
periods due to extended overtime assignments the previous night.
The data submitted show, for example, that the number of
DSS and Transmission Lines that failed in service and had to be
repaired in overtime increased 33% in a single year (1969-1970)
whereas the number repaired during straight-time, daytime
hours remained practically the same.
The changed conditions under which the Company now must

- 3 operate justifies the proposed schedule changes in the Cable
Division.

The clear need of the Company is to have employees

available on a scheduled basis during off-hours, namely for
nights and weekends.

This need is met by the proposed sched-

ules.
The record contains uncontradicted evidence of substantial and significant changes in operating conditions and such
evidence justifies the schedules in the Cable Division as proposed by the Company in its letter to the Union of August 7,
1970 under Article X, Section 5 of the contract.
If there be future changes within the meaning of Article
X Section 5 of the contract, the procedural requirements of
that contract section shall be followed.
"5.

It states;

It is understood and agreed that, if present
operating conditions change or if technological improvements change existing equipment
or introduce new equipment to such an extent
as to justify the Company changing the present Monday through Friday schedules, the Company shall submit the changes to the Union
for approval. If the proposed changes do not
meet with the Union's approval, the issue shall
be settled under the Grievance Procedure in
Article XXIII and by Arbitration under Article
XXXIII."

Eric j$. Schmertz
Chairman

DATED: October 2/1973
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of October, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

American Arbitration Association
VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
UTILITY WORKERS OF AMERICA
AFL-CIO, LOCAL NO. 369
-andBOSTON EDISON COMPANY
CASE NUMBER: 1130-0548-70

AWARD OF ARBITRATORS

T
A HE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR(S),

having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the above-named Parties, and dated
April 25, 1969
and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, AWARI?§ as follows:

The changes of work schedule as proposed by
the Company in its letter to the Union of
August 7, 1970 are justified under Article X,
Section 5 of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chai'rman

John S. Madden
concurring

Robert D. Manning
dissenting

DATED: May 24, 1973
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, New York City Taxicab Industry
Local 3036, AFL-CIO Benefit Fund
and
Butler Maintenance

AWARD
Corporation

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the contract
between the above named parties, and having duly considered the
evidence presented at the duly noticed hearing of October 2, 1973,
makes the following AWARD:

As of June 30, 1973, Butler Maintenance
Corporation is delinquent in payment to
and owes the New York City Taxicab Industry,
Local 3036, AFL-CIO Benefit Fund, the sum
of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHTY TWO DOLLARS
AND SIXTEEN CENTS
($32,082.16)
Accordingly said Employer is directed to
pay said amount to the Fund forthwith.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: October I
1973
STATE OF New Yor£ )ss:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
came and appeared
be the individual
instrument and he

7

f 7
day of October, 1973, before me personally
Eric
Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executedythe same.

* - ; • -aw
Ka, 3K591645
Qualified \r-. New Yo,>:
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2230

f

'
1

and

'
i

Associated Universities, Inc.
Brookhaven National Labaratorv

'
'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated July 1, 1972 to August 1, 1974
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Awards as follows:
The Employer did not violate the Collective
Bargaining Agreement by assigning the "disputed work" to non-bargaining unit biology
personnel.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October
1973
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of October, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 73K12942

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2230
and

Opinion

Associated Universities, Inc.
Brookhaven National Laboratory

In accordance with Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 1, 1972 to August 1, 1974 between
Associated Universities, Inc., Brookhaven National Laboratory,
hereinafter referred to as the "Employer," and International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2230, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Is the assignment of the disputed work by the
Employer to non-bargaining unit biology personnel a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 18, 1973 at Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York, at which time representatives
of the Union and Employer, hereinafter referred to as the
"parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties waived the Arbitrator's oath0

Pertinent to resolution of the issue is Exhibit "B" subdivision III B Paragraph 3 of the contract which reads in relevant part:
Installation, operation, maintenance and repair
of scientific equipment shall continue to be performed by non-bargaining unit personnel

- 2 I am persuaded that the "disputed work,1' assigned to
the Biology Department, one of the scientific departments of
the Employer, involves a scientific research project undertaken by the Employer in cooperation with the Town of Brookhaven to determine whether and how sewage can be distributed
over and returned to the land and the water tables without
chemical treatment.
I am satisfied that the project, together with its pumps,
ponds, wells, testing and other equipment and work duties of
which the "disputed work" is composed, was scientific in nature,
Hence its assignment to non-bargaining unit personnel was consistent with Paragraph 3.
That in the preliminary stages sewage delivered by the
Town of Brookhaven was combined with the plant's sewage and
processed in the regular sewage system by bargaining unit personnel does not mean that the bargaining unit has the contractual right to follow that work from those preliminary stages to
and through its utilization exclusively for the scientific
sewage project (referred to as the "Upland Recharge Project").
Indeed Paragraph 6 of the sub-division IIIB of Exhibit "B" explicitly allows the Employer to assign to bargaining unit personnel "duties and functions customarily performed by non-bargaining personnel."
As I see it, in the preliminary stages the processing and
even treatment of the sewage was either properly bargaining
unit work because at that point it was co-mingled with the
regular plant sewage and processed through the regular sewage

- 3 system or in the alternative, because of its ultimate destination and later use it could be deemed non-bargaining unit work,
assigned for that preliminary period to bargaining unit employees.

Either way I am constrained to conclude that the Union

and the bargaining unit personnel have no claim upon it when
it was diverted to or used solely as part of the Upland Recharge Project.

And I find that the fence was reasonably plac-

ed at the point between regular processing and scientific utilization.
The Union asserts that the job descriptions, which include the type of duties which the non-bargaining unit employees perform as part of the Upland Recharge Project, mean that
that work belongs to the bargaining unit0

I cannot agree0 The

job descriptions are indeed part of the contract.

But clearly

the job descriptions apply to those jobs and those duties that
are in the bargaining unit0

The job titles and the descrip-

tions are bargaining unit positions.

But those jobs and those

descriptions, applicable only to the work which belongs to the
bargaining unit, cannot increase the scope of the unit by extending to work which by contract has been expressly reserved
for non-bargaining

unit personnel0

Moreover a reading of Paragraph 2 of sub-division IIIB
Exhibit "B", which delineates bargaining unit work of the
plant Engineering Department (the Department which the Union
contends should have been assigned the "disputed work") does
not include the kind of experimental, scientific, research
work of which the Upland Recharge Project is comprised.

And

- 4I am not prepared to accept the Union's contention that the
operation of the pianps and related equipment, the filling and
emptying of the ponds, the processing of the sewage through
pipes to the fields and forest, the use of a grid and the
taking and testing of specimens,. all of which are done by the
non-bargaining unit biology personnel, does not involve the
use of scientific equipment and processes in connection with
what I have found to be a scientific project.
Though no doubt bargaining unit personnel, properly instructed, could perform that work, I do not find that the Employer is contractually obligated to assign it to the bargaining unit.
A reading of Paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of the sub-division
IIIB, Exhibit B permits of only one logical conclusion.

And

that is that the "disputed work" falls within or is substantially of the nature meant by the contractual exclusion from
the bargaining unit as set forth in Paragraph 3.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
and

Award
Case No. 33-72

British Overseas Airways Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated July 2, 1970 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards, as
follows:
The Company's transfer in 1972 to non-bargaining
unit employees in Canada, of work which until then
and since 1965 was performed by bargaining unit
Operations Officers at Kennedy Airport was not
violative of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The Union's grievance No. 33-72 is therefore denied.

Eric J/'r Schmertz
Referee
Gordon S. Drain
Concurring

Donald E. Morton
Concurring

Frank Clark
Dissenting

Andrew Coulter
Dissenting
DATED: June 9, 1973
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this 9th day of June, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO
Opinion
and
British Overseas Airways Corporation

In accordance with Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective June 2, 1970 between British Overseas
Airways Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was selected as the Referee of a five-man Board of
Adjustment to hear and decide, together with the Union and Company members of said Board, the dispute involved in Case No.
33-72.
Hearings were held at the Company offices at John F.
Kennedy Airport on February 21 and March 14, 1973.

Representa-

tives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

Messrs. Frank Clark and Andrew Coulter ser-

ved as the Union members of the Board and Messrs. Gordon S.
Drain and Donald E. Morton served as the Company members of
said Board.
The parties filed post hearing briefs and the Board met
in executive session on May 9, 1973.

The parties also express-

ly waived the Arbitrator's oath and the time limit for rendi-

- 2 tion of the Award as set forth in Paragraph (1) of Article XIV
of the contract.
The Union complains that some time in 1972, during the
term of the present Collective Agreement, the Company transferred to non-bargaining unit personnel in Canada, certain
work which bargaining unit Operations Officers at Kennedy Airport had been performing as a regular part of their duties.1'
The Union seeks a ruling by this Board that the Company had no
right to effectuate the transfer of that work and that its removal from the bargaining unit and its assignment to non-bargaining unit Company personnel in Canada was violative of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The material facts are not in dispute.

prior to the

transfer date in 1972, bargaining unit Operations Officers at
Kennedy Airport performed certain duties in connection with
the operation of Company flights into and out of Canada.

It

ip immaterial whether this work was, as the Union contends,
"Flight Watch and Flight Planning" or as the Company calls it
"operation control service," because the parties are in agreement on the substantive nature of that work as it existed in
1972, and on the fact that prior to its transfer to Canadian
personnel, it had been performed at least from 1965 by bargaining unit Operations Officers at Kennedy Airport.
The narrow issue then is whether the Company violated the
contract when, in 1972, it removed certain undisputed work from
bargaining unit Operations Officers and assigned it to non-bargaining unit personnel in Canada.
1. Providing aircraft, upon request, with certain information,
such as weather, airport and runway conditions etc., and
initiating such information when warranted, during thirty
minutes before landing and for thirty minutes after takeoff.

- 3
So viewed, the dispute is one of contract interpretation.
Both parties rely on the same contract provisions, namely
Article II Sections (a) and (b) (first paragraph)

Those Sections

read:
(a) The Company hereby recognizes the Union as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all classes
and grades of Maintenance Supervisors, Passenger
Officers, Cargo Officers, Station Operations Officers,
Operations Officers, Operations as-Coordinators, Baggage Trading Officer and Purchasing Stores Supervisor
employed by the Company within the continental limits
of the United States including Alaska and Hawaii and
its possessions.
(b) All work performed by the Company, including the
work of all classes and grades of Maintenance Supervisors, Passenger Officers, Cargo Officers, Station
Operations Officers, Operations Officers, Operations
Assistants, Operations Clerks, Catering Supervisors,
Ramp Coordinators, Baggage Tracing Officer and Purchasing Stores Supervisor as described in the classification and work requirements in Article IV of
this Agreement is recognized as coming within the
jurisdiction of the International Association of
Machinists as covered by this Agreement.
The Union contends that inasmuch as the work in question
was undisputedly part of the job duties of the Operations Officer
it constitutes "work performed by the Company....within the jurisdiction of the International Association of Machinists as covered by this Agreement," within the meaning of Paragraph (b).
The Union argues that Paragraphs (a) and (b), read together,
accord it exclusive jurisdiction over the classification Operations Officer, expressly vesting the Union with jurisdiction
over the work performed by bargaining unit employees in that
classification.

The Union reasons therefore, that it was im-

properly divested of its jurisdiction over the work the Operations Officers performed between 1965 and 1972 when in the

- 4 latter year the Company transferred that work to Canadian personnel not covered by this contract.
The Company interprets the same contract provisions differently.

It contends that the Union's jurisdiction over the job

classifications enumerated including Operations Officers, is
limited to those "employed by the Company within the Continental
limits of the United States including Alaska and Hawaii and its
possessions."

It argues that the jurisdiction of the Union

over the work performed by employees so classified is conditioned upon that work being performed within the United States, its
possessions and Alaska and Hawaii.

In support of this inter-

pretation the Company points out that the Union's jurisdiction
under Paragraph (b) is confined to the work of the enumerated
job classification "as covered by this Agreement"(underscoring
added).

This means, the Company argues, that because the Union's

bargaining jurisdiction is limited to employees within the
United States, its possessions, Alaska and Hawaii, only when
the Company decides that certain work within the classifications
listed is performed within those geographical bounds does the
Union have a claim on it.

But as here, when the Company decides

to locate the work outside of the United States, its possessions,
Alaska and Hawaii - instead in Canada - neither the Union nor
this Contract can reach it.
In short the Union contends that the performance of work
within the Operations Officers classification must be performed
by bargaining unit employees so classified during the life of
the Collective Agreement; and the Company asserts that only if
"it decides that the Operations Officer work is to be performed

- 5 within the United States, its possessions, Alaska and Hawaii,
must the work be assigned to the bargaining unit.
It is undisputed that this ip the first such case between
the parties, and that Article II Sections (a) and (b) have not
been previously interpreted in connection with this type of dispute.

Moreover, the record before me contains little of the

"legislative history" of those contract sections and there is
no probative evidence of what the parties intended in their
Collective Bargaining negotiations leading to agreement on the
contract language.

Nor is there evidence of a "practice" from

which the Arbitrator can infer what the parties intended.
Hence the Arbitrator has no choice but to resort to the
contract language itself and other relevant contract provisions
between the parties, to reach a determination.
Section (a) is a standard recognition clause.

I am satis-

fied consistent with the view of a majority of arbitrators with
which I concur, that that clause does not bar an employer from
having work performed by employees under the contract transferred elsewhere, for example to a

sub-contractor.

Or in

other words, for legitimate business needs, operational requirements or other bonafide reasons a standard recognition clause
does not bar an employer from giving to a sub-contractor, work
which has been or can be performed by the bargaining unit.
deed the parties to this contract recognized that fact.

In-

They

specifically negotiated limitations on the Company's right to
sub-contract, in the 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article II.
Though the instant dispute is not one of sub-contracting

- 6 (because the work was transferred not to an independent subcontractor, but to Company employees located in Canada) it
cannot be seriously disputed that if Section (a) does not constitute a prohibition on the Company's right to sub-contract,
it similarly cannot be construed as a restriction on the Company's right to assign work within the Operations Officers
classification to its own non-bargaining unit personnel at a
geographical location beyond the scope of this Collective Agreement.
Therefore the question narrows as to whether Section (b)
should be construed as limiting the Company's right to make
the latter transfer.
As appreciative as I may be of the Union's legitimate interest in protecting its jurisdiction and preventing the erosion
of both the size and coverage of the bargaining unit which it
represents, I must conclude that Section (b) cannot be so construed.
Considering that the Company is an airline with operations
world wide, I think it was well within the knowledge and contemplation of the parties that the operational methods, techniques,
and business needs of the Company could change within relatively short periods of time, thereby warranting changes in the way
the Company's work was to be performed.

In this industry par-

ticularly, it was foreseeable that due to technological changes,
new procedures for efficient and safe operation of aircraft,
governmental regulations, and other relevant factors, the Company would be impelled to change not only the nature of its

- 7work, but also the locations at which that work was to be done.
Indeed the very work involved in this case has concededly changed substantially over the years, and prior to 1965 was performed at locations other than Kennedy Airport.
So realistically, these types of changes, both procedurally
and as to location, were well within the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was negotiated.

Yet a specific refer-

ence and limitation was negotiated with regard to "contracting
out," but no similar specific provision was negotiated in
Section (b) with regard to the transfer of work performed by
Operations Officers (among others) to non-bargaining unit employees of the Company.

It seems to me that since this latter

circumstance was or should have been anticipated as much as the
matter of sub-contracting, it should have been dealt with with
the same specificity, if the contract was intended to place a
restriction on the Company's right to unilaterally transfer work
to a geographical location and to employees not covered by the
contract.

That they did not leads to the logical conclusion

that Section (b) was not intended or should not be construed as
a restriction on the Company's right to do so.
Moreover, and perhaps mopt significantly, it is apparent
that the Union knew how to contractually maintain jurisdiction
over bargaining unit work no matter where the Company chose to
have it performed, and negotiated such a protection in connection
with the work specified in the third paragraph of Article II
(Second paragraph of Section (b)).
Basically the Union's argument in the instant case is that

- 8the work of Operations Officers wherever performed belongs to
the bargaining unit.

But contractually that type of coverage

and protection of bargaining unit jurisdiction extends only to
the work delineated in the third paragraph of Article II, That
clause, after enumerating a whole variety of types of work
states:
",,..performed in or about Company shops, Maintenance
Eases,„ OverhaulBases, Line Service Stations, or
wherever performed, is recognized as coming within the
jurisdiction of the International Association of Machinists, and is covered by this Agreement." (emphasis
added).
But the foregoing does not apply to work performed by the
classifications enumerated in the first paragraph of Section (b)
including the work of Operations Officers.
I must conclude therefore that the Company's right to remove work from the bargaining unit and assign it to geographical
locations outside of the United States, its possessions, Alaska
and Hawaii, and beyond the Union's jurisdiction, was expressly
restricted as to work enumerated in the third paragraph of
Article II, but not as to the work in dispute in the instant case.
Lest the Company use this decision too broadly as a precedent, certain facts unique to the instant circumstances should
be pointed out.

First, the transfer of the work performed by

the Operations Officers from Kennedy Airport to non-bargaining
unit personnel in Canada did not cause a layoff and apparently
was not done at a time when qualified Operations Officers were
on layoff status.

Therefore this decision cannot necessarily be

construed as according the Company the right to effectuate such
'a transfer if a layoff results or if qualified Operations Officers
are on layoff status.

- 9Second, in the instant case I am satisfied that there was
a legitimate operational basis for the Company's decision to
re-assign the work to a different location.

The record indicates

an historical operational change in what earlier had been referred to as Flight Watch and Flight Planning, and what at least
in the latter 1960s and early 1970s assumed the title of "Operational Control Service."

I am satisfied that the Company's de-

cision was based on changed technology, a desire to make its
operations more efficient and safe, and for other bonafide business needs.

Therefore this decision cannot be construed as

according the Company the right to effectuate similar transfers
of work under conditions where those reasons are not present.
In short, in no way should this decision be construed by
the Company as an unlimited license to remove bargaining unit
work from the jurisdiction of this Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Also it should be clearly understood that I make no determination one way or the other as to whether the Company met any
statutory duty under the Railway Labor Act or other applicable
statutes, to negotiate with the Union either the transfer of
the work or its impact on bargaining unit employees.
is not before me.

That issue

My authority is limited to determine whether

the Company's action was proper or improper under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement:.

Whether the Company had other obligations,

statutory or otherwise, not referred to in the Collective Agreement, are matters which must be determined in other forums, and
the rights of the parties in that regard are expressly reserved.

- 10 In connection with the immediate foregoing statement I
feel compelled to say that irrespective of the Company's bare
right under the contract, and regardless of any statutory duty
to negotiate with the Union, I think it both unwise and imprudent as a matter of labor relations for the Company to have
effectuated this particular transfer of work from the bargaining unit to non-bargaining unit employees in Canada without
first engaging in good faith discussions with the Union.

Had

the Company done so, .some of the difficulties engendered by
its action herein may well have been avoided.

It seems to me

that in the future, such discussions, which do not prejudice
the contractural or legal rights of the parties, would make a
good deal of sense in the furtherance of a sound and responsible
jf>
relationship.

Eric J. Schmertz
Referee

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION - AND
CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association
and
City of New York (Fire Department)

AWARD
Case A315-73
Case A305-73
Case A304-73

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance in Case A315-73 was granted
by the City.
The Union's grievance in Case A305-73 is denied.
Article III Section 3 of the contract provides for
overtime compensation "for the actual period of
overtime worked." I cannot find that that portion
of an overtime tour which a firefighter is unable to
complete because he has sustained a line of duty injury, constitutes "overtime work" within the meaning
of Article III Section.
Accordingly the Union's claim for overtime pay for a
full tour when a firefighter does not complete that
tour because of a line of duty injury sustained some
time during the tour, must be denied.
In view of the express language of Article III Section 3, limiting cash compensation for overtime to
the "actual period of overtime worked" (emphasis
added) the Union's claim herein is appropriately a
matter for negotiation, not arbitration under this
contract.
The Union's grievance in Case A304-73 is denied,.
I do not find that the City violated Article XII
Section 5 in denying compensatory time off to firefighters off duty at the time when time off was
given civilian employees for the observance of the
deaths of President Truman and Johnson0

- 2 The Union seeks compensatory time off for all
firefighters who were off duty at the time that
civilian employees who were on duty were granted
the time off. I conclude that to grant the grievance would accord the firefighters a greater
benefit than was accorded other City personnel.
It would extend the benefit of time off to firefighters who were then off duty, whereas only
those civilian employees who were on duty were
given four hours off from 1 P0M0 to 5 P0M. on
December 28, 1972 (for President Truman) and
January 25, 1973 (for President Johnson.) It
is undisputed that civilian employees off duty
at the time, albeit few in number, did not get
additional time off. Also it is stipulated that
firefighters who were on duty during those hours on
those days were granted or will be granted the
appropriate time off as required by Article XII
Section 5.
The first two words of Article XII Section 5,
"Excused time" indicates the intent of that Section. As I see it it means that employees may
be excused from work for these observances, and if so,
firefighters are entitled to be excused from work
as well or given compensatory time off later in lieu
thereof. But the threshold eligibility requirement
is that the firefighters, like other City personnel
be at work in order to be excused. It would be a
strained and illogical interpretation for "excused
time" to apply to an employee who is then off duty.
I cannot accept that interpretation.
Accordingly I do not find that the firefighters who
were off duty were similarly situated with civilians who were at work, and consequently I cannot
find that they were not granted an equal benefit
within the meaning of Article XII Section 5 when
the latter employees were given time offa
I recognize that the percentage of firefighters who
received time off was considerably less than the
percentage of the City's civilian work force who
received time off; but as I see it, this was a consequence not of a discriminatory act by the City,
but of the firefighters work schedule (the twoplatoon system). That work schedule is also a part
of the contract and it has been zealously protected
by the Union as a highly beneficial and necessary
condition of employment0

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
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DATED: September
19 73
STATE OF New York ) ss .
COUNTY OF New York) " ' ":
On this *~*day of September, 1973 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 802 American Federation of
Musicians
and

Opinion
and
Award

New York City Opera, a Division of the
City Center of Music and Drama, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was the movement of William Brown from the first
chair in the Horn Section to the second chair in
the Horn Section proper? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 11, 1973 at which time
Mr» Brown, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
It is evident that at the end of the first season under
the contract, and for performances during the subsequent season, the grievant was demoted from the first chair to the
second chair in the Horn Section for artistic reasons.
I conclude that this action by the Employer was neither
contemplated by nor permitted under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

Article THIRTEENTH of the contract sets forth the

courses of action open to the Employer in the event that a
member of the orchestra fails to meet the requisite artistic
standards.

I interpret Article THIRTEENTH, especially para-

graphs a and b thereof to mean that orchestra members shall
be re-engaged each year in the same position they held the

- 2year previously unless for artistic reasons the Employer desires to "dismiss or not re-engage any permanent member of the
orchestra ...."

In other words the contract contemplates only

two possibilities where a member of the orchestra fails to
meet artistic standards, namely dismissal or non-re-engagement.
It does not provide for demotion from a higher or more responsible position to one of lower status.
It is well settled that the right to dismiss includes
therein by implication the right to suspend or reprimand; but
not the right to demote.

If demotion is to be either a remedy

available to the Employer or a penalty to be imposed on an employee, the contract should provide for it explicitly.

Espec-

ially where, as here, the possibility of demotion for alleged
failure to meet artistic standards, was certainly well within
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was negotiated.

That they did not provide for demotion, but rather

accorded the Employer simply the right to dismiss or not reengage a member of the orchestra at the conclusion of any of
the specified years covered by the contract, means that the
parties did not intend to authorize a demotion where an orchestra member's artistic qualifications or performance was in
question.
In the instant case during the first season under the
contract the grievant held a first chair position.

Under

Article FOURTH, Section d 6(e) of the contract he was entitled
to be re-engaged in that position except as provided under
Article THIRTEENTH.

And Article THIRTEENTH negates any such

- 3 re-employment only by "dismissal or non-re-engagement."
In short I find no basis in the contract to expand the
Employer's right to dismiss or not re-engage for artistic
reasons, to include the right to demote,,
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator in the above entitled matter and having duly been
sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above parties, makes the following AWARD:
The movement of William Brown from the first chair
in the Horn Section to the second chair in the Horn
Section was not proper. He shall be reinstated to
the first chair Horn position and made whole for any
loss of wages.

Eric'j. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November 23, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 23rd day of November, 1973, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same0
Case No. 1330 0613 73

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
-and- CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration

'
i

between

'
i

UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION1
i
and

'

AWARD
Case A-303-73

CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT) '

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties at a hearing on May 29, 1973, renders the following
AWARD:
The Union's grievance in case A-303-73
is denied. I am not persuaded that the requirement that Lt. Marvin S. Kestin, after taken to
the hospital following a line of duty injury,
await the arrival of and examination by a
Departmental Medical Officer subsequent to the
end of his regular tour (for an additional 1-3/4
hours) on December 24, 1972, constituted "perform(ance)
(of) work in excess of 'working hours'" within the
meaning of Article III Section 3 of the collective
bargaining agreement.
As I see it the issue is not whether Lt. Kestin
is entitled to overtime compensation under any law
or regulation, but whether he is entitled to overtime pay under the collective bargaining agreement.
The contractual phrase "to perform work in
excess of 'working hours'" as set forth in Article
III Section 3 is best interpreted by the practice
of the parties thereunder and their intent when
the clause was negotiated. The practice has been
uniformly contrary to the Union's position in this
case. Based on my knowledge of the "legislative
history" of Article III Section 3 I cannot conclude
it was intended to cover the instant circumstance.

-2The Union's brief, though both thorough
and legally stimulating, bases its arguments
principally on statutory provisions and cases
not determinative of the instant contract
issue under this employment relationship, and
hence does not serve to overturn the aforementioned practice and negotiated intent. What
the Union seeks under the contract is appropriately
a matter for future collective bargaining not
arbitration.
However I do not decide, because it is
not within my jurisdiction, whether Lt. Kestin
is entitled to overtime pay for the period in
question under any applicable law, other than
the collective bargaining agreement, in any
other forum. The rights of the Union and Lt.
Kestin, if any, in that regard, are expressly
reserved.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July 11, 1973
STATE OF New York V
.
. oo .
COUNTY OF New York )

•

On this eleventh day of July, 1973,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he executed

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
-andCITY OF NEW YORK - (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
Uniformed Firefighters Association '
and

'
'
City of New York - (Fire Department)

AWARD
Cases A248-73; A255-73;
A289-73

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining A greement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
at hearings on March 19, May 24, and June 27, 1973 renders the
following AWARD:
The Union's grievances in cases A248-73 and A255-73
are denied.
I am not persuaded that the subject matter of
those grievances constitute a "policy or regulation
of the Fire Department" within the meaning of
Article XXII Section 1 of the contract. Rather I
am satisified that the particular actions of the
Department were within the Department's managerial
authority and not restricted by provisions of the
contract. This is not to say that the retention of
a fire watch detail at Bellevue Hospital or the
maintenance, without change, of the searchlight, foam
and mask units would not be more beneficial to the
firefighters than under the new arrangements promulgated by the Department. But rather that I find no
breaches of the provisions of the contract, nor do
I find policy or regulation either applicable or
breached. More specifically and by example any prior
practice of maintaining a fire watch detail to
expeditiously care for injured fireman is not confined
to Bellevue Hospital alone. The record discloses that
as a matter of practice the Department has unilaterally
over the years assigned, and elminated fire watch
details at a number of hospitals. Consequently I view
as too narrow the Union's assertion that the prior
continuous and unbroken assignment of a fire watch
detail at Bellevue Hospital constitutes a practice to
which the Department is bound.

Absent an express contract restriction, and I
find none in the current agreement, the methods and
manner by which the Department utilizes the searchlight and foam units remains a prerogative of the
Department under its managerial authority. To prohibit the Department from making the changes involved
herein would impose operational restrictions on the
Department which are not to be found in the contract.
My "ambulance" case is not in point; There I
ordered restoration of that "benefit" primarily because the ambulance was originally paid for by the
contributions of Union members, and that that specific
arid! unique monetary consideration barred the Department
from unilaterally terminating the availability and use
of that ambulance.
Finally s based on ray knowledge of its "legislative
history" I must reject the Union's assertion that
Article XXVII Section 6 is applicable to the secondary
piece of equipment of the mask units.
I make no judgement on the Union's general assertion that all or some of these changes constitute a.
safety hazard to the firefighters. .That assertion, if
meritorious involves the "practical impact" of -managerial decisions of the Department and is a matter within
the jurisdiction of the Board of Collective Bargaining,
The Union's rights to proceed or complain in accordance
with the "practical impact'8 decision of the Board of
Collective Bargaining are reserved.

The_JJrn.on^jS_^
to jthe following extent.:
I find that by agreement of the parties, the
provisions of Article XXVI were or should have been
effective as of February 123 1972. I also find the
Department's requirement that firefighters "sign in
and sign out" to be a. reasonable condition in the
implementation of that Article. However the latter
requirement was not promulgated by the Department
until October 18, 1972, and hence cannot be retroactively imposed on firefighters who otherwise met the
eligibility requirements of Article XXVI between February
12 and October 18, 1972. Accordingly for the period
February 12 to October 18, 1972 the Department shall
pay compensation for travel time covered by said
contract provision to all firefighters who met the
eligibility requirements other than the requirement

-3to "sign in and sign out". From October 18, 1972
the latter requirement, namely to "sign in and
sign out" shall also be a condition of eligibility
for benefits under Article XXVI.

Eric/rf. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July 5, 1973
STATE OF New York ) ss.m
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 5th day of July, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

MAURICE L. SCHOENWALD
WMRY PUBLIC, ST/SFE OF NEW
No. 30-8S39725
In Nasseu County
Man* 3f,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
-andCITY OF NEW YORK - (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association '

and

AWARD
Cases A248-73; A255-73;
A289-73

City of New York - (Fire Department)

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining A greement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
at hearings on March 19, May 24, and June 27, 1973 renders the
following AWARD:
The Union's grievances in cases A248-73 and A255-73
are denied.
I am not persuaded that the subject matter of
those grievances constitute a "policy or regulation
of the Fire Department" within the meaning of
Article XXII Section 1 of the contract. Rather I
am satisified that the particular actions of the
Department were within the Department's managerial
authority and not restricted by provisions of the
contract. This is not to say that the retention of
a fire watch detail at Bellevue Hospital or the
maintenance, without change, of the searchlight, foam
and mask units would not be more beneficial to the
firefighters than under the new arrangements promulgated by the Department. But rather that I find no
breaches of the provisions of the contract, nor do
I find policy or regulation either applicable or
breached. More specifically and by example any prior
practice of maintaining a fire watch detail to
expeditiously care for injured fireman is not confined
to Bellevue Hospital alone. The record discloses that
as a matter of practice the Department has unilaterally
over the years assigned, and elminated fire watch
details at a number of hospitals. Consequently I view
as too narrow the Union's assertion that the prior
continuous and unbroken assignment of a fire watch
detail at Bellevue Hospital constitutes a practice to
which the Department is bound.

-2-

Absent an express contract restriction, and I
find none in the current agreement, the methods and
manner by which the Department utilizes the searchlight and foam units remains a prerogative of the
Department under its managerial authority. To prohibit the Department from making the changes involved
herein would impose operational restrictions on the
Department which are not to be found in the contract.
My "ambulance" case is not in point. There I
ordered restoration of that "benefit" primarily because the ambulance was originally paid for by the
contributions of Union members, and that that specific
and! unique monetary consideration barred the Department
from unilaterally terminating the availability and use
of that ambulance.
Finally, based on my knowledge of its "legislative
history" I must reject the Union's assertion that
Article XXVII Section 6 is applicable to the secondary
piece of equipment of the mask units.
I make no judgement on the Union's general assertion that all or some of these changes constitute a
safety hazard to the firefighters. That assertion, if
meritorious involves the "practical impact" of managerial decisions of the Department and is a matter within
the jurisdiction of the Board of Collective Bargaining.
The Union's rights to proceed or complain in accordance
with the "practical impact" decision of the Board of
Collective Bargaining are reserved.
The Union's grievance in Case A289-73 is granted
to the following extent:
I find that by agreement of the parties, the
provisions of Article XXVI were or should have been
effective as of February 12, 1972. I also find the
Department's requirement that firefighters "sign in
and sign out" to be a reasonable condition in the
implementation of that Article. However the latter
requirement was not promulgated by the Department
until October 18, 1972, and hence cannot be retroactively imposed on firefighters who otherwise met the
eligibility requirements of Article XXVI between February
12 and October 18, 1972. Accordingly for the period
February 12 to October 18, 1972 the Department shall
pay compensation for travel time covered by said
contract provision to all firefighters who met the
eligibility requirements other than the requirement

-3to "sign in and sign out". From October 18, 1972
the latter requirement, namely to "sign in and
sign out" shall also be a condition of eligibility
for benefits under Article XXVI.

Eric y. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July 5, 1973
STATE OF New York ) ss . e
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 5th day of July, 1973 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

*,''.
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Ho. 33-6S397J5
lf}*; In Nassau County
Tfirm Expires March 30,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION - and
THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

4
A

e
1

and

*
i

The City of New York (Fire Department)

Award
Case Nos. A272-72
A273-72

l

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes
the following AWARD•
The Union's grievance in Case No. A272-72 claiming a
violation of Article XXVII of the contract is denied.
I find that the City's action on election night Navember 7, 197j-was limited to a short period of time,
no more than six hours, and was consistent with a
long standing practice which has been followed for
the last 23 years.
The Union's grievance in Case No. A273-72 claiming a
violation of Article VI Section 1 of the contract is
denied, I find that the grievants were properly paid
in accordance with the terms of the contract for the
particular period involved.
/

Eric J; Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: May 29, 1973
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF NEW York)
On this 29th
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of May, 1973 before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
- and - CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration

between

i

Uniformed Firefighters Association
Local 94, AFL-CIO
and

City of New York (Fire Department)

1

'
*
'

AWARD
Case #A-251-72
Case #A-253-72

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties
makes the following AWARD:
Case #A-251-72
This is the third complaint by the Union at the
arbitration level that the City has failed to make
timely payment of overtime and/or out-of-title
earnings. My prior Awards are a matter of record.
It is undisputed that the City has not specifically
complied with points 4 and 5 of the payment schedule
promulgated in my Award in Case #A-200-72 of August
8, 1972. Certain payments due on September 29 and
October 13, 1972 were not made on those dates and/or
had not been made as of the date of the instant hearing on October 18, 1972.
I am satisfied that the City has been making an effort
to make overtime and out-of-title payments on a more
current basis. Payments have been made more speedily
than prior to my most recent Award, and the time schedules set forth in points 1, 2 and 3 of that Award were
met.
The City has stated that it will clear up all
delinquent payments by no later than October 27, 1972
a*ad will meet the prescribed schedule on and after
that date.
Accordingly I shall -give the City until October 27,
1972 to make all payments past due and due on that
date without imposing a penalty. However if said
payments are not made by October 27, 1972, or if the
City fails to meet the balance of payment schedule
set forth in that Award, all late payments will be
due and owing with interest running from the date
due.

- 2 Case #A-253-72
The Union's grievance is satisfied by the issuance
and implementation of PA/ID #16-72 as amended at the
hearing of the instant case. Payment for work performed thereunder shall be made in accordance with
point 7 of the pay schedule set forth in the Award
in Case #A-200-72.

In both the foregoing cases the City withdrew its
procedural challenge to arbitrability without prejudice to its right to require that grievances
filed by the Union be processed through the contractural
grievance procedure before being submitted to arbitration.

Eric Jf Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: October 25, 1972
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this 25th day of October, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)_ AND
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association
Local 94, AFL-CIO
and

Award
and
Opinion

City of New York (Fire Department)

This proceeding involves a complaint by the UFA, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," that the City of New York,
hereinafter referred to as the "City," has -unreasonably delayed payments to firefighters for overtime and out-of-title
work.
A hearing was held on March 31, 1972 at which time representatives of the Union and City appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath.

The parties expressly waived the

Both sides filed post hearing briefs0

There is no dispute between the Union and the City that
certain overtime and out-of-title payments for services performed are due certain firefighters, nor is there a dispute over
the amount of time that has elapsed since earned.
As of the date of the hearing, March 31, 1972, the last
payment for overtime and out-of-title work was for a period
up to and including September 27, 1971.

In other words as much

as six months had passed since the last payment.
On June 8, 1970 I rendered an Award between the same parties in which I held that delays in paying money that was due

- 2 for somewhat lesser periods of time was unreasonable, and inconsistent with the contract requirements that such payments
be made within a reasonable time.
Subsequent to the hearing in the instant case, and in my
capacity as Impartial Chairman between the parties, I discussed the seriousness of this matter with representatives of the
City for the purpose of bringing about more expeditious payment; to clear up the arrears as speedily as possible; and
prospectively to arrange that overtime and out-of-title payments be made on a current and reasonable basis.

In response

the City has advised me that it intends to meet the following
Schedule:
1. Payment for overtime and acting out-of-title work
earned for the period up to and including February
15, 1972 will be made no later than August 4, 1972.
2. Payment for overtime and acting out-of-title work
performed between February 16, 1972 and March 31,
1972 will be made no later than August 18, 1972.
3. Payment for overtime and acting out-of-title work
performed between April 1, 1972 and May 15, 1972
will be made no later than September 15, 1972.
4. Payment for overtime and acting out-of-title work
performed between May 16, 1972 and June 30, 1972
will be made no later than September 29, 1972.
5. Payment for overtime and acting out-of-title work
performed between July 1, 1972 and August 15, 1972
will be made no later than October 13, 1972 „
6. Payment for overtime and acting out-of-title work
performed between August 16, 1972 and September 30,
1972 will be made no later than October 27, 1972,
7. Thereafter, payment for overtime and acting out-oftitle work will be made regularly within 60 days
after the Ordered Overtime Duty Reimbursement
Application or the Report of Out-of-Title work are
filed.

- 3 I think the foregoing to be an acceptable Schedule, and I
consider it reasonable that when current, the City regularly
pay firefighters for overtime and out-of-title services no later
than 60 days after the Application for Reimbursement or Report
of said work has been filed, as indicated in #7 above.
Accordingly as Impartial Chairman between the above named
parties I make the foregoing Schedule my AWARD.

I shall retain

jurisdiction over this case for implementation of that Schedule.
In the event that the City does not meet the Schedule the
Union may so notify me for my consideration and for whatever
action I deem appropriate„

iric 4/'Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: August
1972
STATE of New York )
COUNTY of New York) ' " *
On this
day of August, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)
and
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Uniformed Firefighters Association
Local 94 AFL-CIO

'
'

and
City of New York (Fire Department)

'
i

Award
and
Opinion

'

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Fire Department violating Article III and
Article XI of the contract when upon returning
from vacation a fireman is assigned to any group
different from the group he was in when he started his vacation?
A hearing was held at the Office of Collective Bargaining on March 27, 1972 at which time representatives of the
above named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.
The Articles referred to in the stipulated issue are
the Work Schedule and Vacation and Leave provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement,,
It is undisputed that the regular working time of a fireman for which he is paid his regular rate of pay totals 2088
hours a year; not to exceed 144 within each 25 day work cycle;
and the resultant work week of 40.32 hours is adjusted to an
average of 40 hours by one annual 15 hour tour off (the adjusted tour.)
Vacations are included within the foregoing periods of
time.

- 2 From time to time, upon returning from vacation, when a
fireman is assigned to a group different from the group he
was in when he commenced his vacation, he works more hours
than the total regular hours referred to above.
It is undisputed that the Department has the right to
assign a fireman to a group different from the one he was in
at the time his vacation commenced.

But if the result is to

increase his working hours in excess of the maximum regular
periods referred to above, those additional hours must be considered as overtime.

And in that event the affected fireman

is entitled to overtime pay for those additional hours in
accordance with the overtime provisions of the contract.
Accordingly the Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the parties, makes the following AWARD:
When, upon returning from vacation, because of an
assignment to a group other than the one in which
he worked when his vacation began, a fireman works
more than the total number of regular working hours
(including vacation time), those additional hours
(i.e. in excess of 144 in a 25 day cycle or in excess of 2088 per year) shall be paid for at the overtime rate in accordance with the overtime provisions
of the contract. The Department's present practice
of not compensating a fireman for these additional
hours at the overtime rate is violative of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

- 3 -

DATED: May
1972
STATE OF New York) ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

Case No. A-201-72

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATIONAND - CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT.)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

'
t
'
Opinion
and
1
Award
' Case No. A278-72
1

'

and

The City of New York (Fire Department)

A hearing was held on December 22, 1972 at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The issue is the Union's grievance dated December 4, 1972.
The Union complains that the Department's plan to change the
number of vacation groups or periods from ten to eight commencing January 1, 1973 is violative of Article XII Section 1
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and violative of the
policy of the Department.
The Union's grievance is meritorious.
Article XII Section 1 of the contract incorporates into
the Collective Bargaining Agreement the Regulations for the
Uniformed Force covering the Annual Leave Allowance Program
for the Fire Department.

By consequence said Regulation be-

came part of the negotiated Collective Agreement.

I find that

its relevant substantive provisions, as they existed when the
contract was negotiated, are per force fixed for the term of
the contract unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.
The current applicable Regulation is Chapter 17 (Leaves

- 2 of absence) and specifically Section 17.7.5 which in pertinent
part reads:
Maintenance of the ten year progressive vacation
system for members below rank of lieutenant shall
be in accordance with the following procedure:
(c) Master schedules for the ten year period,
indicating lettered groups and related
vacation leave numbers, shall be promulgated and used as a control for maintenance
of such system.
(d) Vacation periods each year shall be apportioned in ten vacation leave numbers, and
schedules for such leaves promulgated annually and issued to all units. (Underscoring supplied.)
Accordingly I find that the ten group or ten period vacation structure was jointly incorporated into the current
Collective Bargaining Agreement by express reference in
Article XII Section 1 thereof.

And as part of that contract

I must conclude that the parties agreed to a vacation and leave
program which included not simply a vacation allowance in terms
of quantity, but also a program which encompassed the then existing ten group structure.
I also find, pursuant to the foregoing, that the Department is foreclosed from unilaterally changing Regulation 17.7.5
for the balance of the present Collective Bargaining Agreement.
It is well settled that a jointly negotiated condition of employment may not be unilaterally changed by one of the parties
during the life of the applicable contract covering that condition.
The Department contends that it unilaterally established
and promulgated the ten group structure many years ago, and

- 3 that it never relinquished its right to make changes in that
program, even during the term of a Collective Agreement, so
long as the quantity of a fireman's vacation remained untouched.

The evidence does not support this contention.
In addition to the foregoing analysis and interpretation

of Article XII Section 1 of the current contract, there is
substantial evidence showing that the ten group structure was
worked out, indeed "negotiated," by and between the Department
and the Union prior to January 1, 1959 when that program commenced.

The evidence indicates that a Union representative

devised the ten group structure (to replace the then existing
nine group structure) in order to accommodate the vacation entitlement within the nine hour and fifteen hour tour system.
And that to do so the Union was willing to accept a reduction
in the vacation entitlement from 216 hours (then enjoyed by
other City employees) to 210 for firemen.

The evidence dis-

closes that the ten group "chart," as devised by Union representative McQueeney, was adopted by the Department some time
prior to January 1, 1959 and was promulgated as the Annual
Leave Allowance Program for the Fire Department effective January 1, 1959.

Though at that time the Union was not yet

officially certified as the bargaining agent for the members,
de facto "negotiations" took place on many subjects covering
conditions of employment including, as indicated, the vacation
leave program.

Consequently I must conclude, contrary to the

Department's position, that the vacation program, including
the ten group structure, was arrived at by mutual agreement.

- 4 Hence from its inception and as affirmed by later contract language, it was and is a negotiated condition of employment.
The ten group structure continued from January 1, 1959
to the present.

It continued through the contract negotiations

and the terms of the 1966 and 1968 Collective Bargaining Agreements.

The pertinent parts of Articles XI Section 1 of those

prior contracts are the same as the pertinent part of Article
XII Section 1 of the current Agreement.
It is undisputed that at no time during those negotiations
or those contract periods, nor during the negotiation of the
current (1971) contract did the Department seek to change the
ten group structure.

Nor did the Department give any indication

to the Union that it planned any such change or that it reserved the right to do so.
Accordingly, with a history dating back to January 1, 1959,
and without any changes thereafter during three successive contract negotiations, the Union had reasonable grounds to believe,
and to rely thereon, that the ten group structure was part of the
contract and was not subject to unilateral change by the Department.

Hence, what demands were made and what negotiations took

place on the subject of vacation leaves in the three negotiations which lead to the only written contracts entered into by
the parties, were impliedly if not expressly within the framework of the ten group structure which neither side sought to
change.
It may be, as the Department contends, that an eight group
plan is more beneficial to the firemen than the long standing

- 5 ten group structure.
issue before me.

But that possibility is immaterial to the

For if,by operation of the contract the De-

partment does not have the unilateral right to change the Program, it may not make a change irrespective of the merits of
why it wishes to do so.
Accordingly the Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties, makes the following Award:
The Union's grievance dated December 4, 1972
is granted. The Department may not unilaterally change the existing ten group vacation
program for the balance of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement. Therefore the Department shall not install its eight group
schedule effective January 1, 1973.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: December 26, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 26th day of December, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
-and- THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
1

Uniformed Firefighters Association,
Local 94 IAFF, AFL-CIO

1
1
1

Case No. A249-72
A250-72
A252-72
A260-72

and
The City of New York (Fire Department '
i

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
renders the following Award and Opinion:

Case No. A249-72
The Union's grievance claiming violation of
Article XII of the contract is denied because
said contract provision is self-remedial.

Its

own terms provide for a remedy in the evant
that a fireman cannot take his personal leave
day(s) by the end of the "succeeding fiscal year"
due, among other reasons, to the "needs of the
Fire Department".

He is to "be compensated for

the same in cash ..."
Accordingly so long as the Department pays a
fireman for the personal leave day(s) which he is
unable to take for any of the reasons set forth

-2-

in Article XII Section 2 of the contract, the
failure or inability of the Department to allow
a fireman to take an accrued personal leave day(s)
off is not violative of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.

Case

No. A250-72
The Union withdrew this grievance from arbitra-

tion without prejudice.

Case No. A252-72
This grievance concerns the Maintenance of
Personal Firefighting Equipment and requires the
application and interpretation of the following
language written in the Fact Finding Recommendations and subsequently agreed to by the parties':'
"The present practice (one half hour)
shall continue and shall also apply
from the time of 'final tap-in'".
The narrow issue is whether "final tap-in"
includes return from a "false alarm" run.
The phrase "tap-in" has a particular meaning
in the Fire Department.

It means that a Company

has returned to quarters from a run in response to
an alarm.

No distinction is made among the types

of alarms to which the Company has responded.
Specifically it has not excluded a return from a
run which turned out to be a false alarm.

-3Accordingly the use of the phrase "tap-in"
in its traditional and occupational sense by the
Fact-Finders, without any special limitation, perforce includes false alarms as well as returns
from structural fires, and emergencies (such as
a building collapse).

Accordingly the Department shall apply and implement the agreed upon language consistent with
the foregoing interpretation.

To that extent the

Union's grievance is granted.

Case No. A254-72
An Award on the Union's grievance relating to
Article XXVII Section 6 of the contract will be
rendered within the next few days.

Case No. A260-72
It is undisputed that the Union cannot claim
a violation of the "five-man manning" provisions
of the contract if a Company runs with less than
five men when the vacancy in that particular
Company is because the delegate of that Company
is on vacation or at a delegate or Union meeting.
But those are not the facts in the instant dispute.
Rather the Department has been following a procedure
of "floating" the vacancy created by the absence of
the delegate.

-4-

For example, where a vacancy is created in
Ladder Company A due to the absence of the delegate, the Department has transferred a fireman
from Engine Company B to cover that vacancy.
Engine Company B then runs with less than the
requisite manning.
Because this procedure was not part of the
discussions of the parties when the exceptions
to the five-man manning requirements were negotiated, I conclude that it is not an agreed upon
circumstance within those exceptions.

I am

satisfied that the Union agreed to waive its
right to complain about less than five-man
manning only where a particular Company did not
meet the minimum manning requirements

because

the delegate of that Company was unavailable for
the reasons mentioned.

I find no evidence that

the Union agreed to or even was advised that this
exception to the five-man manning requirement,
namely when a delegate is on vacation or at a
delegate or Union meeting, would be implemented
to exclude from the contractual five-man manning
requirements a Company whose own delegate is not
absent.

-5-

While I appreciate the operational reasons
advanced by the Department, the Department's
manner of implementating this particular exception to the "five-man manning" requirement
is simply inconsistent with how that exception was
mutually understood and agreed to by the parties.

Accordingly the Department shall cease its
policy and procedure of "floating" a vacancy
created by the delegate's absence.

That particular

exception to the five-man manning provisions of
the contract shall apply to the particular Company
whose delegate is absent due to vacation or his
attendance at a delegste or Union meeting.

The

Union's grievance is granted to that extent.

Eric Jf.' Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: December 4, 1972
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) °'
OOn this fourth day of December, 1972 before
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
same.

me personally
known to me
the foreexecuted the

FRANK T. ZOTTO
Public, State of New York
No. 41-9811480
Quailed in Queens County
Commission Expires Mofsn 30,

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
AND THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

Uniformed Firefighters Association

'

and

'

City of New York (Fire Department)

'

i
i
t

Award
A-261-72
A-262-72
A-263-72
A-264-72
A-265-72

i

Having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
p arties, the following shall be the disposition of the indicated grievances and cases:
C:age A.-261-72
By no later than November 20, 1972, the City shall
promulgate a procedure which may be responsive to
the Union's claimed violation of Articles XXVIII and
XXIX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. If
that procedure is not dispositive of the grievance,
the dispute may be referred back to the Undersigned
for determination.
Case A-262-72
The Union's grievance claiming a violation of Article
XII Section 7 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
is granted as follows:
By no later than November 20, 1972 the Department shall issue appropriate instructions to its
officials directing compliance with said provisions of the contract.
Case A-263-72
The Union's grievance claiming a violation of Article
XII Section 8 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
is granted as follows:
By no later than November 20, 1972 the Department shall issue appropriate instructions to its
officials directing compliance with said provisions of the contract.

- 2 Case A-264-72
The Union's grievance claiming a violation of Article
VI Section 5 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
is granted as follows:
The City will pay the $15.00 in question with
the next payment of the uniform allowance in
December, 1972.
Case A 265-72
The Union's grievance claiming a violation of Article
XXI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is granted
as follows:
By no later than November 20, 1972 the Department shall issue appropriate instructions to its
officials directing compliance with said provisions of the contract.

Eric /J.Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: November 13, 1972
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this 13th day of November, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

.f

...

»»<
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
AND CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

Order

and

City of New York (Fire Department)
The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties issues
the following ORDER:
Subsequent to the negotiation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, the parties agreed on a methof yf allocating the night shift differential different from the contract. They have not agreed upon
the mathematical "factor" needed for implementation
of the new method. The Union has submitted to the City
what the Union considers to be an appropriate "factor."
The matter was raised at a hearing on October 25, 1972.
The City had not by then completed preparation of its
"factor" for the Union's consideration. The City stated
that it would do so by November 8, 1972, and the Arbitrator accorded the City the time it requested,,
At the hearing on November 8, 1972 the City did not
present its "factor" and has not done so to-date.
The City advises it needs a few additional days to do
so.
The City shall present its "factor" to the Union, with
a copy to the Undersigned, by no later than the close
of business on Wednesday, November 15, 1972. Forthwith
thereafter representatives of the parties shall meet in
an effort to resolve any differences which may exist in
the respective factors. If for any reason a resolution
is not achieved by the close of business on Monday, November 20, 1972, the matter may be referred to the Undersigned for determinatione

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

- 2 DATED: November 13, 1972
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 13th day of November, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same0

